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 A private corporation is proposing a high-speed intercity passenger train system 
to operate between Dallas and Houston using Japanese technology and methods. This 
project brings with it an array of unique and unprecedented homeland security issues. 
Train bombings in Madrid and London and attacks on high-speed trains elsewhere raise 
questions about the security of such transportation. A modern high-speed rail system is a 
network of potential vulnerabilities, and terrorist groups have identified public 
transportation as desirable targets. Should the State of Texas require homeland security 
standards for high-speed rail? 
A review of the literature reveals the number and consequences of terrorist actions 
against passenger rail in general and intercity high-speed trains in particular. In addition, 
it suggests that this writing is the first in its specific application. This thesis places the 
project in historical and geographical context and reviews potential vulnerabilities using a 
framework developed by the Argonne National Laboratory. Furthermore, it includes a 
fault tree analysis and an options analysis through which possible approaches are 
identified and analyzed. Finally, this thesis finds that the State of Texas should require 
homeland security standards and provides recommendations for action in the areas of law 
enforcement, cybersecurity, intelligence, privacy, screening, psychological and mental 
health effects, and community involvement.  
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 From 2004 to 2008, terrorists killed over 2000 people and injured over 9000 more 
in 530 separate attacks targeting passenger rail systems.1 The Transportation Safety 
Administration (TSA) considers passenger railroads to be  
high consequence targets in terms of potential loss of life and economic 
disruption as they carry large numbers of people in a confined 
environment, offer the opportunity for specific populations to be targeted 
at particular destinations, and often have iconic structures.2  
Regarding the more limited subset of high-speed passenger trains (HSR) worldwide, 
between 1970 and 2012, there were 33 high-speed rail attacks, which killed 32 people.3 
The August 2015 attempted French high-speed train terrorist attack is a reminder that 
intercity high-speed passenger trains are likely targets for terrorism.  
While cyberattacks have occurred,4 terrorist attacks on passenger rail systems 
have primarily targeted physical systems, notably Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, 
Mumbai in 2006, and Kunming in 2014. The French HSR line is fenced, but in 1995, 
saboteurs penetrated the fence and planted a bomb. Tragedy was averted when the bomb 
failed to explode.5  
The Texas Central Railway (TCR), a private corporation, is proposing a high-
speed intercity passenger train system to operate between Dallas and Houston6 using 
                                                 
1 Nabajyoti Barkakati, and David Maurer, Technology Assessment: Explosives Detection Technologies 
to Protect Passenger Rail (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010), 12.   
2 73 Fed. Reg. 72130 (2008). 
3 Brian Michael Jenkins et al., Formulating a Strategy for Securing High-Speed Rail in the United 
States (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2013), 9.    
4 Aliya Sternstein, “Hackers Manipulated Railway Computers, TSA Memo Says,” NextGov, January 
23, 2012, http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2012/01/hackers-manipulated-railway-computers-tsa-
memo-says/50498/.  
5 Brian Michael Jenkins, Bruce R. Butterworth, and Jean-Francois Clair, The 1995 Attempted 
Derailing of the French TGV (High-Speed Train) and a Quantitative Analysis of 181 Rail Sabotage 
Attempts (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2010).  
6 Jody Serrano, “High-Speed Rail Firm’s Chief: Public Meetings Set for Proposal,” The Texas 
Tribune, September 20, 2014.  
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Japanese technology and methods.7 TCR proposes a 205-mph train;8 however, existing 
high-speed rail in the U.S. does not exceed 110 mph, except for a 28 mile stretch of 150 
mph-capable track in the northeast.9 This is not the first high-speed rail proposal for 
Texas,10 and there are other proposals in various stages in other states. However, this 
project has the potential to be the first of its kind implemented in the country, which one 
writer has said would “be a transformative event in the history of the nation’s 
transportation system.”11  
Through the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the federal 
government has security oversight for passenger rail systems. Its approach for rail is 
similar to that for intercity buses, as opposed to the screening and security levels 
provided for air transportation. State homeland security requirements and programs for 
Texas are authorized by Chapter 421 of the Texas Government Code.12 The statutes 
require the governor to develop a homeland security strategy with specific plans for 
protecting critical infrastructure and coordinating with other public and private sector 
entities, among other duties.  
Current statutory guidance and requirements regarding critical infrastructure 
protection are minimal and broad. If a first-of-its-kind, large-scale, privatized 
infrastructure project, which presents an attractive target for terrorists, goes into revenue 
service, the paradigm will have shifted. The security framework may well be tested under 
real-world conditions with any shortcomings becoming glaringly apparent.  
                                                 
7 Ibid.  
8 Aman Batheja, and Stephen J. Smith, “The Bullet Train that Could Change Everything,” The Texas 
Tribune, August 18, 2014. 
9 Yonah Freemark, “Why Can’t the United States Build a High-Speed Rail System?” The Atlantic’s 
CityLab, August 13, 2014, http://www.citylab.com/politics/2014/08/why-cant-the-united-states-build-a-
high-speed-rail-system/375980/. 
10 Marc H. Burns, High-Speed Rail in the Rear-View Mirror: A Final Report of the Texas High-Speed 
Rail Authority (Austin, TX: MH Burns, 1995).  
11 Batheja, and Smith, “The Bullet Train that Could Change Everything.”  
12 Texas Legislative Council, Texas Government Code, Chapter 421: Homeland Security (Austin, TX: 
Texas Legislative Council, 2003).  
 xvii 
Short of statutory change, the state does not appear to have the ability to impose 
any security standards or requirements on the project, which raises these questions: 
should the train operators be required to participate in intelligence-gathering efforts? Is it 
in the state’s interest to mandate a level of law enforcement presence, either on board the 
train or at stations? Will financial backers of the Texas Central Railway (TCR) system 
require security standards, both as a means of protecting the asset and its ability to 
generate revenue to repay its debts? 
The Argonne National Laboratory13 has created a framework for use in evaluating 
site security14 that lists six major components: security management, physical security, 
information sharing, security force, dependencies, and protective measures.15 Evaluating 
these components through selected subcomponents and applying the utility tree analysis 
outlined by Morgan D. Jones,16 along with probability and fault tree analysis, yields a 
number of possible options and approaches. This results in a finding that the State of 
Texas should require homeland security standards for HSR. Given the unique and 
precedent setting nature of the project, the legislature should be proactive in creating 
specific requirements or expectations. In addition, it should ensure state enforcement 
agencies have sufficient authority to ensure the provision of public safety for a private 
sector transportation project. These requirements may include a legal ability to acquire 
and enforce representations made regarding the system’s security provisions and also 
should address how law enforcement is achieved, how the project interacts with the 
intelligence community, and baseline requirements for cyber security, passenger data 
privacy, vulnerability and threat assessment, and community considerations and 
involvement along the route. 
  
                                                 
13 “Better Infrastructure Risk and Resilience,” Argonne National Laboratory, last modified August, 
2010, accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.anl.gov/articles/better-infrastructure-risk-and-resilience. 
14 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. “Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection,” last modified 
September 9, 2015, accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/ecip.  
15 Robert E. Fisher et al., Constructing Vulnerability and Protective Measures Indices for the 
Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (No. ANL/DIS-09-4), (Argonne, IL: Argonne National 
Laboratory, 2009), http://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/966343. 
16 Morgan D. Jones, The Thinker’s Toolkit: Fourteen Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving (New 
York: Three Rivers Press, 1998), 252.  
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State homeland security requirements and programs for Texas are authorized by 
Chapter 421 of the Texas Government Code.1 The statutes require the governor to 
develop a homeland security strategy with specific plans for protecting critical 
infrastructure and coordinating with other public and private sector entities, among other 
duties. While guidance in some areas is specific and conflicting (for example, the 
Homeland Security Council is constituted in three different ways), guidance and 
requirements regarding critical infrastructure protection are minimal and broad.  
The state can control its own assets and programs, but statutorily and 
philosophically it has limited control over the private sector. According to the state 
planning documents, the legislature created several statewide advisory groups to support 
implementing the plan, including the Texas Critical Infrastructure Protection Council 
(TCIPC). The TCIPC has both private and public sector participants.2 However, beyond 
this voluntary participative measure, there does not appear to be a way to compel 
cooperation or participation, or even create enforceable requirements, from the state’s 
homeland security perspective.  
This inability does not appear to create any significant issues under current 
conditions. However, if a first-of-its-kind, large-scale, privatized infrastructure project, 
which presents an attractive target for terrorists, goes into revenue service, the paradigm 
will have shifted. The security framework may well be tested under real-world conditions 
with any shortcomings becoming glaringly apparent.  
A private corporation is proposing a high-speed intercity passenger train system to 
operate between Dallas and Houston, Texas3 using Japanese technology and methods.4 
                                                 
1 Texas Legislative Council, Texas Government Code, Chapter 421: Homeland Security (Austin, TX: 
Texas Legislative Council, 2003).  
2 Rick Perry, Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan: 2010–2015 (Austin, TX: Texas Department of 
Public Safety, 2010). 
3 Jody Serrano, “High-Speed Rail Firm’s Chief: Public Meetings Set for Proposal,” The Texas 
Tribune, September 20, 2014.  
4 Ibid.  
 2 
The Texas Central Railway (TCR; officially the Texas Central High-Speed Railway, in 
partnership with the Central Japan Railway Company, or JRC) is leading this effort.5 The 
private (publicly traded) JRC currently operates over 300 high-speed trains each day 
between Osaka and Tokyo. 
TCR proposes a 205-mph train;6 existing high-speed rail in the U.S. does not 
exceed 110 mph except for a 28 mile stretch of 150 mph-capable track in the northeast.7 
This is not the first high-speed rail proposal for Texas,8 and there are other proposals in 
various stages in other states. However, this project has the potential to be the first of its 
kind implemented in the country, which one writer has said would “be a transformative 
event in the history of the nation’s transportation system.”9 Figure 1 shows the routes in 
consideration for the project as of October 2015.  
                                                 
5 “Texas Central Railway: America’s Bullet Train,” New Magellan Venture Partners, LLC, accessed 
November 14, 2015, http://newmagellan.com/page8/page11/index.html.  
6 Aman Batheja and Stephen J. Smith, “The Bullet Train that Could Change Everything,” The Texas 
Tribune, August 18, 2014.  
7 Yonah Freemark, “Why Can’t the United States Build a High-Speed Rail System?” The Atlantic’s 
City Lab, August 13, 2014, http://www.citylab.com/politics/2014/08/why-cant-the-united-states-build-a-
high-speed-rail-system/375980/.  
8 Marc H. Burns, High-Speed Rail in the Rear-View Mirror: A Final Report of the Texas High-Speed 
Rail Authority (Austin, Texas: MH Burns, 1995).  
9 Batheja and Smith, “The Bullet Train that Could Change Everything.”  
 3 
Figure 1.  Dallas-Houston HSR County Map with Recommended 
Alternatives 
 
Source: “Dallas-Houston High Speed Rail County Maps,” Federal Railroad 
Administration, accessed October 5, 2015, https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L16213.  
High-speed trains have developed sophisticated approaches to reducing threats 
from natural disasters and conditions. Japanese trains, engineered with earthquakes in 
mind, all came to a safe stop during the 2011 Fukushima disaster without loss of life or 
serious injury.10 There is one known instance of a high-speed train in England derailing 
                                                 
10 Nobuo Mimura et al., “Damage from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami: A Quick 
Report,” Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 16, no. 7 (2011): 803–818. 7.   
 4 
with loss of life; the cause was rail fatigue.11 A 2013 high-speed train crash in Spain was 
the result of human error.12 However, there is a long and growing list of fatalities and 
injuries from terrorist attacks against passenger transportation systems including intercity 
high-speed trains. The possibility has been raised by area residents: the Commissioners 
Court of Grimes County, Texas has gone on record opposing the project, listing five main 
objections, including increased risk of terrorist attacks.13 A real estate broker asked in a 
public scoping meeting for the project’s environmental impact study if the “bullet train is 
bullet proof?”14 
In fact, there are serious concerns about how the project sponsors will address the 
potential for acts of terrorism. These concerns stem from instances around the world as 
well as the specifics of the TCR project. Barkakarti and Maurer calculated that “from 
January 2004 through July 2008 there were 530 terrorist attacks worldwide against 
passenger rail targets, resulting in more than 2,000 deaths and 9,000 injuries.”15 The 
Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) considers passenger railroads to be:  
High consequence targets in terms of potential loss of life and economic 
disruption as they carry large numbers of people in a confined 
environment, offer the opportunity for specific populations to be targeted 
at particular destinations, and often have iconic structures.16  
                                                 
11 M. Kameswara Reddy et al., “Stress Analysis on Behaviour of Rails,” International Journal of 
Engineering Research 4, no. 1 (2015): 4–8. http://works.bepress.com/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1431&context=irpindia.  
12 Lucas Laursen, “Spanish High-Speed Train Crash Offers Safety-System Lessons,” Scientific 
American, July 26, 2013, accessed December 28, 2014, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ish-high-
speed-train-crash/.  
13 “County, Anderson Officially Oppose Bullet Train,” The Navasota Examiner, last modified January 
14, 2015, accessed November 14, 2015, http://www.navasotaexaminer.com/news/article_1fef694c-9c13-
11e4-a952-976fd25da9c2.html.  
14 “County Judge-Elect Leads Charge to Derail Bullet Train,” The Navasota Examiner, last modified 
December 10, 2014, accessed November 14, 2015, http://www.navasotaexaminer.com/news/
article_7d0e59e2-7ffa-11e4-a057-eb71e891d34d.html.  
15 Nabajyoti Barkakati, and David Maurer, Technology Assessment: Explosives Detection 
Technologies to Protect Passenger Rail (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010).  
16 73 Fed. Reg. 72130 (2008). 
 5 
TCR clearly falls into this category because, along with other aspects, it will have 
iconic structures.17 Further, there is international precedent for attacks on high-speed 
trains. Between 1970 and 2012 worldwide, there were 33 high-speed rail attacks, which 
killed 32 people.18 However, in 40 years, there has only been one death involving a U.S. 
train that could be ascribed to a terrorist action, a 1995 incident derailing Amtrak’s 
Sunset Limited.19 Also, one school of thought is that an initially high threat level due to 
HSR newness will subside over time.20  
Like other high-speed trains, the TCR system will accomplish the movement of 
people through physical rail cars over rails. Terrorist attacks on passenger rail systems 
include Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, Mumbai in 2006, and Kunming in 2014. The 
French HSR line is fenced (as TCR’s will be) but in 1995, saboteurs penetrated the fence 
and planted a bomb which failed to explode.21 
Cyber systems such as train control and electronic aspects like online ticketing 
require sophisticated security precautions. Protections for rail systems, even those with 
sophisticated electronic protections, can be defeated by people who already have access. 
A number of examples appear later in this thesis.  
This writing was prepared using publicly available information. None of the 
materials used were classified or labeled “For Official Use Only” or “Law Enforcement 
Sensitive.” This approach allows for the broadest dissemination of the information of this 
writing but brings with it two key limitations. 
The first limitation is that the proposed project is private sector-driven. The 
project developer expects the plans to change over time. Certain details of the project are 
                                                 
17 Nicholas Sakelaris, “High-Speed Rail Station Will be ‘Iconic’ Part of Dallas Skyline, CEO Says,” 
Dallas Business Journal, November 21, 2014.       
18 Brian Michael Jenkins et al., Formulating a Strategy for Securing High-Speed Rail in the United 
States (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2013), 9.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.                 
21 Brian Michael Jenkins, Bruce R. Butterworth, and Jean-Francois Clair, The 1995 Attempted 
Derailing of the French TGV (High-Speed Train) and a Quantitative Analysis of 181 Rail Sabotage 
Attempts (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2010).  
 6 
proprietary and thus have not been released. For example, the company has not released 
any ridership studies, nor is it required to at this point. Therefore, it is necessary that this 
writing rely on published reports regarding the proposed project from sources that include 
the company, its participants and sponsors, public reports from relevant government 
agencies, magazine and news articles (including online publications), observers, and 
other interested parties. A study by the RAND Corporation, which specifically examined 
publicly available information about transportation infrastructure in order to assess 
vulnerabilities, found “the utility and comprehensiveness of information available in the 
public domain varies by infrastructure and scenario.”22 In New York, a red team exercise 
based on a scenario where terrorists attempt to bomb a commuter train, based on the 
Madrid incident, planners “did not find any publicly available data suggesting there are 
any countermeasures in place to thwart the attack scenario….”23  
The second limitation is that a number of government agencies have been, are, or 
will be involved in the proposed train project. There are at least a dozen federal agencies 
and three state agencies involved in the environmental impact study alone.24 Inherently, 
publicly released government information in the security area is limited. There is no 
requirement that either the government or the private sector release information regarding 
security considerations for a private sector project. The possibility that security 
considerations merit a public discussion, while controversial, has taken place in other 
arenas. For example, some have argued that environmental impact statements for nuclear 
power plants should address the potential environmental effects of a terrorist attack.25 
That particular conversation has led to multiple lawsuits and conflicting legal rulings. As 
things currently stand, there is no such federal requirement for public review, and an 
exposition and analysis of the costs and benefits as far as critical transportation 
infrastructure is concerned is beyond the scope of this writing.  
                                                 
22 Eric Landree et al., Freedom and Information: Assessing Publicly Available Data regarding U.S. 
Transportation Infrastructure Security (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007).   
23 Ibid., 68. 
24 Federal Railroad Administration, Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail Environmental Impact 
Statement: Scoping Report (Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, 2015).  
25 Amanda Mott, “Should the Threat of a Terrorist Attack on a Nuclear Power Plant be Considered 
Under NEPA Review,” UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 12 (2007): 333.    
 7 
The TCR project is unlike any other in this country but shares some aspects of 
existing transportation approaches. Like airlines and intercity buses, it is privately owned. 
Like public-sector commuter rail systems, it is a steel wheel on steel rail train, and like 
some passenger trains in the Northeast Corridor, it is powered by electricity from 
overhead wires.  
This proposal brings with it an array of unique and unprecedented homeland 
security issues. Train bombings in Madrid and London, the Aum Shinrikyo episode in 
Japan, and attacks on high-speed trains elsewhere raise questions about the security of 
passenger rail transportation. A modern high-speed rail system is a network of potential 
vulnerabilities, and terrorist groups have identified public transportation as desirable 
targets. The train set with its passenger load is both a physical target and a symbolic 
target—an attack could be a statement against wealth or foreign investment, and would 
likely result in considerable media coverage. There are hundreds of miles of right-of-
way26 and track structures, including intermodal stations, maintenance facilities with 
train storage areas, and the physical grid that provides electricity to power the trains. 
Train control, financial, ticketing, and other back-end systems are potential cyber targets. 
Train control systems are the biggest element in the system’s safety plan and pose a large 
security threat. To address threats effectively, this particular project should be integrated 
with law enforcement, especially intelligence. Consequences of failure to anticipate and 
protect the train system range from financial loss to fatalities, immediate and long-term 
injuries, and symbolic victories for terrorist entities.  
Through the Transportation Security Administration, the federal government has 
security oversight for passenger rail systems. Its approach for rail is similar to that for 
intercity buses as opposed to the screening and security levels provided for air 
transportation. Passenger rail receives minimal security oversight from the state level. 
Local rail systems are public entities and provide their own security or rely on police 
agencies.  
                                                 
26 The term “right of way” is used in this thesis to mean the entirety of the land TCR will own or use 
for the path of the train.  
 8 
Short of statutory change, the state does not appear to have the ability to impose 
any security standards or requirements on the project. Should the train operators be 
required to participate in intelligence-gathering efforts? Is it in the state’s interest to 
mandate a level of law enforcement presence, either on board the train or at stations? Will 
financial backers of the Texas Central Railway (TCR) system require security standards, 
both as a means of protecting the asset and its ability to generate revenue to repay its 
debts? 
This rail project raises many questions that merit attention and review.  
• Given the unique nature of the project, should government’s oversight role 
change?  
• What homeland security factors should be considered as this private sector 
project moves forward?  
• Should there be a required analysis, as part of the National Environmental 
Policy Act review or freestanding?  
• Are there or should there be roles for federal, state, and local government 
regulation, participation, or oversight?  
• If not a direct role, are there impacts that these agencies would be advised 
to prepare for?  
• Are the methods used in the Northeast Corridor and elsewhere applicable 
to this project, or does its higher speed, privatized nature, geography, or 
approach require different methods?  
• What are the expectations for privacy if the railroad provides Wi-Fi and 
cell phone coverage?  
• What are the implications of heavy foreign investment and involvement?  
My hypothesis is that the State of Texas should require homeland security 
standards for high-speed rail. These standards would provide a baseline set of 
requirements for projects of this nature, and could include precedents for how law 
enforcement is achieved; how the project leaders interact with the intelligence 
community; considerations regarding cyber security; passenger privacy, vulnerability, 
and threat assessment; and participation in planning committees. This topic will be of 
interest to an audience of policymakers, homeland security practitioners, and possibly 
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even the project developers. It provides some flexibility so that if this project should 
cease, the research would lay the groundwork for a paradigm applicable to future 
projects.  
The following chapters describe the proposal in more detail, providing historical 
information about terrorist incidents affecting rail transit generally as well as high-speed 
intercity passenger rail specifically. The various chapters identify and discuss 
vulnerabilities and threats, frame the legal context, compare possible approaches, and 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THE STATUS OF RESEARCH, GENERALLY 
Seven universities house federally-supported centers of transportation security 
excellence. These centers are charged with a broad area of transportation-related security 
issues, including threat identification, resilience, policy, and training.27 However, with a 
few exceptions, there are few publications emanating from these institutions regarding 
potential high-speed intercity rail implementations in the U.S. and, in particular, very few 
if any that are specific to the TCR project.  
The major public entity with a high-speed rail security focus is San Jose State 
University’s Mineta Transportation Institute. The major private, nonprofit entity is the 
RAND Corporation. A key author, Brian Michael Jenkins,28 is associated with both. This 
focus is logical, given that they are both headquartered in California, which has had a 
state-level authority attempting to implement a high-speed rail project since 1996. 
Jenkins appears to be the most prolific author in this area.29 His works, cited by hundreds 
(according to Google Scholar), appear to be comprehensive, thoroughly researched, and 
consistent with other studies in the area. There is one notable exception; Jenkins alone 
has theorized that any threat to high-speed rail above any other commuter rail will 
subside when the newness wears off.30 
                                                 
27 “National Transportation Security Center of Excellence,” Department of Homeland Security, Office 
of University Programs, accessed December 7, 2014, https://ntscoe.hsuniversityprograms.org/centers-of-
excellence/ntscoe/.  
28 Brian Michael Jenkins, “About—Brian Michael Jenkins,” accessed December 7, 2014, 
http://www.brianmichaeljenkins.com/about/.         
29 Jenkins, Butterworth, and Clair, The 1995 Attempted Derailing of the French TGV; Brian M. 
Jenkins, and Joseph Trella Carnage Interrupted: An Analysis of Fifteen Terrorist Plots against Public 
Surface Transportation (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2012); Brian M. Jenkins, Terrorism 
and the Security of Public Surface Transportation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2004); Brian 
M. Jenkins, and Bruce R. Butterworth, “Mineta Transportation Institute Says Subways are Still in 
Terrorists’ Sights,” PRN Newswire, March 24, 2014, accessed December 7, 2014, 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/mineta-transportation-institute-says-subways-are-still-in-
terrorists-sights-252015231.html.        
30 Brian Michael Jenkins et al., Formulating a Strategy for Securing High-Speed Rail in the United 
States (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2013), 14.  
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There are a wide range of academic studies that are applicable to high-speed rail 
as a part of a larger mass transportation network. For instance, Michael Greenberg of 
Rutgers University works in this area.31 Like Virginia Tech’s Pamela Murray-Tuite32 and 
Sunniva Meyer of the Institute of Transport Economics in Oslo, Norway,33 Greenburg 
identifies aspects of transportation security that can be mathematically modeled, thus 
projecting likely outcomes when the inputs are varied. Meyer uses a prisoners’ dilemma-
like approach, which is broadly applicable. The studies of both Greenberg and Murray-
Tuite would need their variables to be adjusted to local conditions to be directly 
applicable. Many other studies address high-speed rail but do not take up security issues. 
One report, a graduate paper titled “High-Speed Rail in the US: Will It Be a More 
Attractive Terror Target than Inter-city Rail?,”34 is recent and on point, except it is not 
specific to Texas or Japan. However, it contains sensitive information so while its 
usefulness in this writing, intended to be open source, is limited, it can be evaluated 
within the context of the research.35 
B. SUBGENRES 
Subgenres include the record and practice in Japan, high-speed rail security as 
implemented and experienced elsewhere in the world, general protection of critical 
                                                 
31 Michael Greenberg et al., “Passenger Rail Security, Planning, and Resilience: Application of 
Network, Plume, and Economic Simulation Models as Decision Support Tools,” Risk Analysis 33, no. 11 
(2013): 1969–1986.    
32 Pamela M. Murray‐Tuite, and Xiang Fei, “A Methodology for Assessing Transportation Network 
Terrorism Risk with Attacker and Defender Interactions,” Computer‐Aided Civil and Infrastructure 
Engineering 25, no. 6 (2010): 396–410.           
33 Sunniva F. Meyer, “Preventing Mass Killings: Determining the Optimal Allocation of Security 
Resources between Crowded Targets,” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 17, no. 1 
(2011).            
34 Donna R. Maurillo, “High-Speed Rail in the US: Will it be a More Attractive Terror Target than 
Inter-City Rail?” (master’s thesis, San Jose State University, 2012).  
35 The report carries this statement: “Some of these materials, especially those related to law 
enforcement alerts or other security-sensitive resources, have been designated as unclassified but for 
official use only (U/FOUO). Access has been given to this researcher by security sources with the 
understanding that any U/FOUO information made available to the public will be used only in aggregate. In 
any instances where U/FOUO documents have been quoted or made identifiable in this report, they have 
been identified as such.” 
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infrastructure along with and key resources, security for transportation under both public 
and private sectors, and unique aspects of this particular proposed project. 
1. Transportation Security in the United States 
A significant body of work is available regarding transportation security in the 
United States. Approaches used by various authors include looking at the subject from 
the perspectives or particular interests involved in mass transit, critical infrastructure, and 
natural and man-made disasters. Authors who have taken a position are in general 
agreement that “airline-style” security is inappropriate for trains because it would reduce 
or eliminate trains’ usefulness36 or be no more than “security theater.”37  
Transportation and passenger security are well covered in a series of studies from 
the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), Government Accountability Office (GAO), and others.38 These tend to be generic 
or lean towards commuter rail. As Mass Transit Magazine’s Kim Kaiser notes (citing 
Brian Jenkins),39 there are important differences between the two, such as the HSRs have 
more kinetic energy at speed and are constructed above ground.  
2. Unique Aspects of the Proposed Project 
The recent and unprecedented nature of the proposed project limits scholarly 
research to the project developer’s formal submissions to the state and federal 
governments, the developer’s public-facing website, statements, and representations, and 
media articles. The developer’s representations are of questionable value as they carry the 
disclaimer:  
                                                 
36 Brian D. Taylor, “Terrorist Attacks and Transport Systems,” ACCESS Magazine 1, no. 28 (2006).    
37 Michael Scott Moore, “High-Speed Rail’s Weak Link is Security,” Pacific Standard, May 4, 2011, 
accessed October 27, 2014, http://www.psmag.com/navigation/politics-and-law/high-speed-rails-weak-
link-is-security-30874/.    
38 For example David R. Peterman, Bart Elias and John Frittelli, Transportation Security: Issues for 
the 111th Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009); Patrick O’Malley, TSA’s 
Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Emergencies (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, 2010).   
39 Kim Kaiser, “High-Speed Rail Security Needs a Different Approach than Commuter Rail,” Mass 
Transit Magazine, August 11, 2011, accessed December 8, 2014, http://www.masstransitmag.com/article/
10317151/high-speed-rail-security-needs-a-different-approach-than-commuter-rail.   
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All claims and descriptions of the high-speed rail system’s operations, 
including service and station amenities, are solely suggestions of 
potentiality based on examples from other high-speed rail around the 
world and for promotional purposes only. TCR will not be the owner, 
developer, implementer nor operator of the railroad. The railroad’s owner 
or operator will be responsible for coordinating with regulatory agencies 
and others regarding the specific aspects of the system’s service.40  
Documents submitted by or to the state and federal governments in association with the 
environmental impact statement, found on a dedicated website,41 are more reliable due to 
the legal requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. It is possible that some 
of the information may become available after environmental clearance is achieved. The 
corporation’s priorities are likely to be oriented first toward resolving legislative concerns 
and getting contracts in place for design-build construction, train equipment/rolling stock, 
and operating and maintenance contracts (O&M)—all necessary to provide hard numbers 
for their financial plans and debt/equity offerings. Second, TCR will be working out its 
safety system plan with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). This plan might 
provide a nexus for security concerns (e.g., how TCR will protect the train control 
systems that ensure safety) in addition to standard rail safety concerns as they may apply 
to a trainset and system not currently in operation in this country (e.g., details about the 
vehicle construction, such as window glazing). News and web-based media may have 
information unavailable elsewhere due to interviews or research, but so far, they have 
rarely provided much insight into the details of the project itself. This may be as much a 
function of the details not having yet been decided, as them having been decided but not 
being available.  
3. High-Speed Rail Security Issues around the World 
In addition to the aforementioned works, several authors have produced reviews 
or analysis of high-speed rail and terrorism or security issues. For instance, Francesca De 
                                                 
40 David Benzion, “Texas Central Railway,” Texas Central Railway, accessed September 21, 2014, 
http://texascentral.com/.  
41 Michael Johnsen, “Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail—Passenger Service from Houston to 
Dallas,” Federal Railroad Administration, accessed September 21, 2014, https://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/
P0700.  
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Cillis analyzed 540 criminal and terrorism related incidents on passenger rail (not limited 
to high speed rail) to find key similarities and project high vulnerabilities. She concludes 
that stations are the most likely targets and with attacking such venues that higher body 
counts can be expected.42 Dylan Kissane produced an excellent analysis of terrorism and 
the French high speed train.43 There is not much agreement among authors as to whether 
the station, the trainset itself, or the right-of-way is the most vulnerable aspect of a high-
speed rail system. This area requires further analysis and thought, and the answer is likely 
to vary depending on the design of these aspects and the capabilities of those who would 
pose a threat. This writing engages a systematic approach to discussing vulnerabilities in 
relation to potential threat vectors. 
4. What is the Real Japanese High-Speed Train Safety Record? 
Information about the true safety and security record of Japanese trains is hard to 
come by, which may be a result of the privatized nature of the Japanese rail system. Some 
discussions about Japanese high-speed rail omit safety altogether, claim no fatal 
accidents,44 or give it only a cursory treatment. In a 2012 presentation, a senior official of 
Japan’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism railroad department gave 
a 34-slide PowerPoint presentation. In it, the safety slide discussed train control and gave 
one sentence pertaining security: “Fatalities to date: ZERO for 47 years since the start of 
operation in 1964.”45 The rest of the presentation is wholly positive about the train, 
suggesting the national agency is more protective of this technology and participating in 
its marketing to other countries than it is interested in balance.  
This zero fatalities claim is qualified, however, by the Central Japan Railway 
Company in its online material as “no passenger fatalities or injuries due to train 
                                                 
42 Francesca De Cillis et al., “Analysis of Criminal and Terrorist Related Episodes in Railway 
Infrastructure Scenarios,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 10, no. 2 (2013): 
447–476.     
43 Dylan Kissane, “Terror on the TGV? The Terrorist Threat to France’s High Speed Train Network,” 
(Paris: Centre d’Etudes Franco-Americain de Management, 2007).  
44 Inaki Barron, “50 Years of High Speed Rail,” UIC e-News, no. 418, October 7, 2014, International 
Union of Railways, accessed December 7, 2014, http://uic.org/com/uic-e-news/418/.  
45 Akihiko Tamura, An Overview of Japan’s High Speed Rail: Shinkansen (Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of 
Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism, 2012), 10.  
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accidents such as derailment or collision in commercial train operations during 47 years 
of service.”46 JRC’s material online is extensive but the safety and security portions are 
focused on mechanical issues and earthquakes.  
Figure 2 shows the Shinkansen N700-I in a multitrack urban setting with gantries 
providing overhead electrical service. Figure 3 shows it with two tracks in a rural setting. 
Figure 2.  Shinkansen N700-I in Multitrack Urban Setting 
 
Source: “Shinkansen N700-I,” Railway Technology, accessed October 5, 2015, 
http://www.railway-technology.com/projects/n700-shinkansen/n700-shinkansen1.html.  
 
                                                 
46 “Safety,” Central Japan Railway Company, accessed December 7, 2014, http://english.jr-
central.co.jp/about/safety.html.          
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Figure 3.  Shinkansen N700-I In Rural Two-track Configuration  
 
Source: “JR Central/JR West N700 Series,” Japan Times, September 27, 2014, accessed 
October 5, 2015, http://jto.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/p14-
schreiber-shinkansen-g-20140928-870x489.jpg.47  
Even though Japanese high-speed trains are integrated into the overall passenger 
rail system, a 1995 sarin gas terrorist incident that resulted in 12 fatalities and thousands 
injured occurred in the subway, not in the high-speed rail portion.48 In addition, a man 
who set fire to himself as a political protest in 2014 did so outside the Shinjuku railway 
station, and the incident had no impact on high-speed train operations or passengers. 
JRC’s website also reveals that two unexploded bombs, apparently U.S. Navy ordnance 
dating from World War II, have been found at the high-speed train factory, and that travel 
schedules were disrupted when the bombs were disposed of.49 
Jenkins of the Mineta Institute found four Shinkansen fatalities: three suicides by 
people jumping from trains and one death of a passenger caught in a train door.50 If one 
                                                 
47 The article by Mark Schreiber, “Shinkansen at 50: Fast Track to the Future,” that accompanies the 
image can be found at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2014/09/27/lifestyle/shinkansen-50-fast-track-
future/#.VhL0Dyuq2VA. 
48 Jason Testar, “What Tokyo Taught Us,” Homeland Defense Journal 1, no 3 (June: 2003): 34–39. 
49 Central Japan Railway Company, The Effect of Bomb Disposal at the Hamamatsu Workshop Site on 
Train Service (Tokyo, Japan: Central Japan Railway Company, 2012); Central Japan Railway Company, 
The Effect of Bomb Disposal at the Hamamatsu Workshop Site on Train Service (Tokyo, Japan: Central 
Japan Railway Company, 2013).         
50 Jenkins et al., Formulating a Strategy for Securing High-Speed Rail in the United States, 50.  
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assumes the train was operating properly in the case of the train door death, the JRC’s 
qualified statement would be accurate. However, any blanket “zero fatalities” statement 
would not, and other questions would be raised about how the issue was accounted for 
and resolved. However, the Mineta report does not cite or source the statement in 
question, so an exact answer is elusive.  
In June of 2015, a man set himself on fire inside a JRC Tokyo-to-Osaka high-
speed train, killing himself and a passenger and injuring 26 people, mostly from smoke 
inhalation.51 It remains to be seen how this incident will be represented in safety 
materials going forward.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Working from the general (transportation security) to the specific (security 
implications of the proposed Texas project), the research field appears like an inverted 
pyramid. At its widest is a vast range of literature chronicling historical terrorism on 
transportation facilities. In the middle are academic analyses quantifying various aspects 
and using the results to identify possible vulnerabilities or recommend actions. As the 
field is narrowed to HSR and then HSR in the U.S., a few authors and sources become 
prominent. In some instances, more research is needed to provide a basis to determine 
credibility. At the exact point this writing examines, it appears that this work is the first 
of its kind.  
                                                 
51 “Man Sets Self on Fire on Japanese Bullet Train, Killing Himself and 1 Other,” New Europe, 
accessed October 29, 2015 http://neurope.eu/wires/man-sets-self-on-fire-on-japanese-bullet-train-killing-
himself-and-1-other.  
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III. MAJOR COMPONENTS 
DHS has contracted with the Argonne National Laboratory52 to create a 
framework for use in evaluating site security for the DHS Enhanced Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Program.53 The framework lists six major components: Security 
Management, Physical Security, Information Sharing, Security Force, Dependencies, and 
Protective Measures.54  
These major components combined have 42 subcomponents. Table 1 lists the 
major components and their subcomponents.  
Table 1.   Major Components and Subcomponents for Measuring 
Vulnerability (Argonne National Laboratory)  




Closed-circuit television (CCTV) 
Intrusion detection system (IDS) 
Parking 
Lighting 
Vehicle access control 
Building envelope 
2. Security Management 
Business continuity plan 
Security plan 
Emergency action plan 
Threat levels 
Security information communication 
External security exercises 
Executive protection program 
                                                 
52 “Better Infrastructure Risk and Resilience,” Argonne National Laboratory, last modified August, 
2010, accessed October 6, 2015, http://www.anl.gov/articles/better-infrastructure-risk-and-resilience.  
53 “ECIP: Homeland Security,” Department of Homeland Security, last modified September 9, 2015, 
accessed October 6, 2015, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/ecip.   
54 Robert E. Fisher et al., Constructing Vulnerability and Protective Measures Indices for the 
Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (No. ANL/DIS-09-4), (Argonne, IL: Argonne National 
Laboratory, 2009), http://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/966343.  
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Security working groups 
Sensitive information identified 
National security clearance 
Background checks 







After hour security 
Checks recorded 
Command and control 
Memorandum of understanding (MOU)/memorandum of agreement 
(MOA) 
4. Information Sharing 
Threat sources 
Information sharing mechanisms 
5. Protective Measures Assessment 
New protective measures 
Random security measures 
6. Dependencies 
Critical products (chemicals, fuels, raw materials, packaging, medical 
supplies, feed, and by-products/waste) 
Electricity 
Information technology (Internal and Internet business, and internal 
and Internet control) 
Natural gas 
Telecommunications (telephone, data, and radio link) 
Transportation rail, air, road, maritime, and pipeline 
Water 
Wastewater 
Adapted from Fisher et al., “Constructing Vulnerability and Protective Measures 
Indices,” 4.  
This list provides a good set of constructs from which to draw. For the purposes 
of a fault tree analysis, we will use these measures for our framework. Subsequent 
sections address each major component in more detail through the consideration of 
subcomponents. Moreover, specific subcomponents have been selected for analysis due 
to the need for brevity and manageability. 
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A. PHYSICAL SECURITY 
Protecting a train system involves anticipating where someone might try to attack 
or breach the system and addressing those points. System entry can be accomplished 
using human vectors (insiders or people who inadvertently or maliciously allow a 
defensive measure to be defeated), cyber vectors (computer-based intrusions), and 
breaches of a physical item like a building or fence.  
1. Introduction 
Intercity passenger train systems have three main physical components: the 
stations (nodes), the trainset itself, and the right-of-way (including maintenance 
facilities). Each component has subsets that operate in the background, including electric 
grid, communication, and cyber systems. 
Texas Central Railway (TCR) has stated that it intends to use N700-I,  
The international version of the Tokaido Shinkansen total system currently 
in operation between Tokyo and Osaka, Japan. This international version 
will feature the core system—passenger train, overhead catenary, tracks, 
signaling—along with all of the corresponding maintenance and 
operations protocols that have made Tokaido Shinkansen operations so 
safe, efficient and successful for nearly 50 years.55 
The Central Japan Railway Company (JRC), a participant in TCR, represents that 
this holistic approach to the physical system is essential in providing a safety record 
similar to that experienced in Japan. Implementing this project as a holistic, integrated 
unit allows coordinating the track and trainset to optimize the geometry and physical 
interaction. According to a company presentation, JRC “has secured the safety and the 
high quality of the Tokaido Shinkansen through the integrated management of both the 
hardware and software that make up the system.”56 The physical system is a network of 
networks, a system of systems, designed from the ground up to function well as a unit, 
                                                 
55 David Benzion, “The Facts,” Texas Central Railway, accessed September 21, 2014, 
http://texascentral.com/the-facts/.   
56 Tsutomu Morimura, Introduction of the N700-I Bullet (Nagoya, Japan: Central Japan Railway 
Company, 2010).  
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which should provide greater service than separately produced systems at the cost of sole 
source acquisition and increased expense.57  
The proposed high-speed rail system is an electric steel wheel on steel rail 
passenger train system that is a fully fenced and grade separated. The N700-I is designed 
for each train to consist of at least six passenger cars, up to 15 passenger cars, in which 
every axle is powered, with a non-passenger car on each end. The maximum cruising 
speed is 205 miles per hour (330 kilometers per hour).58 The train will connect Dallas 
and Houston—about 250 miles (400 kilometers)—and take about 90 minutes, with trains 
running at 30-minute intervals at the outset.59  
In addition, TCR has indicated there will be at least one multimodal station (node) 
in Dallas and one in Houston, and at least one intermediate station, located in Shiro; 
however, the locations of any maintenance facilities are only speculative at this point. 
In terms of vulnerabilities and threats, Wilson and others from the RAND 
Corporation examined over 800 terrorism incidents in the rail transportation arena around 
the world.60 They found that about three fourths of the attacks involved physical 
infrastructure and were intended to hurt passengers. These attacks were on the rail itself, 
the interior of train cars, and stations.61 Additionally, one fourth of the attacks were at 
stations, one fourth inside train cars, and one fourth on tracks. Seventeen percent were on 
the outside of train cars, five percent on supporting infrastructure, four percent on areas 
outside of stations, and three percent on equipment (any errors are due to rounding).  
                                                 
57 Dianna Wray, and Eric Nicholson, “What Will a Bullet Train Mean for the Future of Texas?” 
Houston Press, last modified August 18, 2015, accessed October 8, 2015, http://www.houstonpress.com/
news/on-the-line-will-the-houston-dallas-bullet-train-revolutionize-texas-or-divide-it-forever-7679365.  
58 Morimura, Introduction of the N700-I Bullet, 5.  
59 Scott Dixon, “Texas to Get Shinkansen System,” The Japan Times, August 2, 2014, 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/08/02/business/economy-business/private-u-s-railway-wants-
bullet-train-line-for-texas-by-2021/#.VB7cHhZ_TYQ.  




2. Passenger and Baggage Screening 
The intersection of the stations and trainsets is the point where passengers board 
trains. The Texas Legislature may take an interest in this particular point of vulnerability 
and the question of whether passengers and their carry-on luggage receive the kind of 
scrutiny that those at airports do. (At this writing, the U.S. Coast Guard is proposing that 
cruise ships begin using screening procedures similar to airports.)62 
This discussion generally views “airport-style security” as the kind that takes 
place at commercial aviation airports. There are other kinds of aviation with different 
approaches to security in particular general and business aviation—privately owned, 
corporate leased, or that otherwise running on a different security structure. General 
aviation airports alone account for 3000 airports, the largest slice of the U.S. airport pie.63 
Industry,64 federal,65 legislative,66 and executive67 agencies, and states68 have invested a 
great deal of study in general aviation as well.  
Aviation security is sometimes part of a larger discussion about homeland 
security and related issues. For example, when Congress passed the REAL ID act,69 
                                                 
62 “Cruise Ships Face Airport-Style Security Measures,” The Hill, last modified December 9, accessed 
November 15, 2015, http://thehill.com/regulation/226514-cruise-ships-facing-new-airport-like-security-
measures.  
63 “General Aviation Airports Report—Airports,” Federal Aviation Administration, last modified 
March 19, 2014, http://www.faa.gov/airports/planning_capacity/ga_study/.   
64 For example, “General Aviation Security Information for Journalists, Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
Association,” accessed December 6, 2015, http://www.aopa.org/Media-Relations/Position-Papers/General-
Aviation-Security.aspx.  
65 For example, “Aviation Security,” Department of Homeland Security, last modified September 23, 
2015, http://www.dhs.gov/general-aviation.   
66 For example, “GAO Report on General Aviation Security Risks, Airports Council International-
North America,” accessed December 6, 2015, http://www.aci-na.org/content/gao-report-general-aviation-
security-risks.   
67 For example, Transportation Security Administration, Security Guidelines for General Aviation 
Airports (Information Publication A-001), (Washington, DC: Transportation Security Administration, 
2004), https://services.oregon.gov/aviation/docs/guidelines_for_ga_airports.pdf.   
68 For example, General Aviation Security (National Association of State Aviation Officials, Silver 
Spring, MD, 2002), http://www.state.nj.us/transportation/airwater/aviation/pdf/nasao.pdf. 
69 “REAL ID Act—Title II, H.R.1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the 
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and 
Senate), accessed December 6, 2015, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/real-id-act-text.pdf.  
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states were expected to change their driver license and state-issued identification 
processes to comply. Several states either asked to postpone compliance with the various 
provisions of REAL ID or, in some instances, refused to participate. In response, those 
states were told their driver licenses and state issued identification would not be 
recognized at airports and, if enforced, would deny their citizens access to commercial 
airliners.70 
In Texas, there is precedent for state legislative involvement in commercial 
aviation. The Dallas-Fort Worth Airport is essentially a joint local government.71 State 
legislative activity paved the way for the federal repeal of the Wright Amendment,72 
enabling long distance direct flights from Dallas Love Field.73 More recently, the Texas 
Legislature has focused on what some perceive as intrusive examinations at airports. In 
2011, the Texas Legislature considered legislation that would essentially subject TSA 
personnel to a charge of official oppression if they touched a passenger.74 The bill saw 
passage in the House but stalled in the upper chamber when the federal government 
threatened to restrict interstate flights, citing security reasons.75 In 2013, Texas attempted 
to create a Security Screening Opt-Out Program, but the legislation did not pass.76 In 
2015, the legislature passed a resolution asking Congress to require the TSA to accept a 
                                                 
70 Daniel C. Vock, “Feds Push Gently on ‘REAL ID,’” Pew Trusts, January 22, 2014, 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/01/22/feds-push-gently-on-real-id.  
71 “DFW Airport Administration,” Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, accessed December 6, 
2015, https://www.dfwairport.com/about/admin/index.php.  
72 N. B. “The Wright Amendment: Good Riddance,” Gulliver [The Economist blog], December 12, 
2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2014/12/wright-amendment.  
73 The Wright Amendment, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, 109th Cong. (2005), http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg62992/html/CHRG-109shrg62992.htm.   
74 “House Bill 1937, Texas Legislative Council,” 2011, accessed December 6, 2015, 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/Text.aspx?LegSess=82R&Bill=HB1937.  
75 Mac Slavo, “Feds Threaten Texas with No-fly Zone over Anti-TSA Legislation,” SHTFPlan, May 
25, 2011, http://www.shtfplan.com/headline-news/feds-threaten-texas-with-no-fly-zone-over-anti-tsa-
legislation_05252011.  
76 “House Bill 1719,” Texas Legislative Council, 2013, accessed December 6, 2015, 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=83R&Bill=HB1719.  
 25 
Texas concealed handgun license as a form of official identification,77 but as of this 
writing, the TSA does not allow any weapons license to serve as proper identification.78  
The literature generally provides little guidance in this area. A RAND study found 
the most Europeans do not like having their person or bags searched, preferring faster and 
less intrusive security measures, such as cameras and security personnel.79 An 
independent Australian review of aviation security notes malfunctioning machinery at 
certain airport security stations but does not suggest that the problem is widespread or 
significant. Speaking about Australian general aviation airports, John Wheeler reported,  
Unmanned, undermanned, or poorly-equipped access points to restricted 
areas both inside and outside terminals clearly represent weak spots. 
Abuse, misuse, or false use (including tailgating) can occur with obsolete 
or unsophisticated swipe-card systems. A thorough inspection for 
contraband of the contents of each vehicle entering and leaving the secure 
area would prove oppressively expensive, and probably so time-
consuming that airport functioning would be seriously impaired.80  
However, he offers no recommendations in this area. In Comparative Homeland Security, 
Morag concisely describes the three different types of regulated airports in Australia as 
well as the unregulated general aviation airfields and notes the great variation in 
passenger screening among them.81 A representative of airline pilots, quoted in The Myth 
of Security at Canada’s Airports, suggests more emphasis should be placed on screening 
of employees and others with access to airplanes than on screening passengers.82 In a 
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report for the European Parliament, Hobbing and Koslowski note that the U.S. is moving 
toward collecting and using biometric information, but, at the time the report was written, 
the TSA preferred that it happen at airline check-in as opposed to in the security line.83 
To summarize: there are distinct levels of aviation that are generally treated 
differently from a security standpoint. Passenger screening is a visible and personal 
aspect of commercial airport security but practices vary widely, based on perceived 
utility and price. TCR has stated that its passengers will not undergo the type of intensive 
screening used at commercial aviation airports in the U.S. The type of passenger or 
baggage inspection that may or may not be employed by TCR is a decision that 
ultimately rests with the TSA, which has not said what it will require. It is probably a 
good indication of the type of screening to be used that airport-style screening is not 
currently used on ground transportation, such as buses or passenger trains. The Texas 
Legislature may wish to address the issue, given its history, or may wish to ensure that 
the issue can be addressed administratively.  
B. SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
This high-speed rail proposal brings with it an array of homeland security 
concerns, and since it is a technologically-driven solution to a mass transportation 
problem, there are technology and human-related concerns at every turn. This section 
provides a literature review specifically regarding these concerns as raised by or applied 
to the TCR project. Technology is addressed through the subgenres of cybersecurity and 
energy/electrical, while human concerns addressed are insider threats and human error. 
Finally, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and train control is addressed 
in a later chapter. 
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1. Cybersecurity 
There is a wealth of literature in cybersecurity generally, cybersecurity for the 
private sector, and cybersecurity for critical infrastructure (primarily energy and electrical 
but also transportation).84 Martin Rudner wrote:  
Cyber-attacks directed at Critical National Infrastructure constitute a 
significant, diverse, and rapidly escalating risk-element in the global threat 
environment. Critical infrastructures are susceptible to cyber-attacks 
precisely because of their high inherent value and intrinsic vulnerabilities, 
coupled with a significant potential to inflict widespread harm on targeted 
countries.85 
The government has a duty to provide cyber protection for its activities and, by extension, 
the public sector. Many authors would extend that obligation to also cover the private 
sector. Rice, Miller, and Shenoi compare it to missile batteries placed around domestic 
population centers in the 1960s; they were to protect from incoming threats regardless of 
their targets. The authors also note that military cyber operations depend on other sectors 
for electricity and transportation, so they merit protection as well.86 At a minimum, the 
military is red-teaming the use of cyber technology to derail American hazardous 
material trains.87 Capra, writing from the U.S. Air Force (USAF) Counterproliferation 
Center, reports that “the Association of American Railroads testified before the U.S. 
Senate that the National Guard would be needed to secure critical assets during 
heightened states of alert.” However, Capra points out that the National Guard would 
need to be operating under civilian authority to avoid violating the Posse Comitatus 
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Act.88 Bradbury provides legal support for the position that cyber-attacks are not a clear 
military action or events involving armed force,89 and Rollins and Henning conclude that 
governmental mandates could be placed upon the private sector without invoking war 
powers.90 Still, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Hayden sounds 
skeptical when he writes about government’s role in protecting critical infrastructure: 
“The statutory responsibility… falls to the Department of Homeland Security, but does it 
have the ‘horses’ to accomplish this? Do we await catastrophe before calling for DOD 
intervention, or do we move preemptively?”91 
There is a distinction between the U.S. government’s role in cybersecurity 
regarding the public and private sectors and its internal cyber processes, although they are 
related. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) inspector general has cautioned, 
“DOT must also ensure the integrity of transaction data and reports that account for the 
billions of dollars used for highway reconstruction, high-speed rail development, and law 
enforcement grants.”92 
There is a limit to the role of government in cybersecurity. For instance, 70 
percent of consumers responding to a ThreatTrack survey said government should not 
dictate to private companies how they should handle and store their private data, nor 
dictate which technologies businesses should use to secure their networks.93 For even a 
limited role, Rice, Miller, and Shenoi place the responsibility at the federal level because 
of the multistate implications of possible scenarios but believe it should be a civilian 
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authority, the Department of Homeland Security, in charge.94 This is the case as a result 
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,95 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, and Presidential Policy Directive 21, with 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S. Department of Commerce) 
leading the development of a critical infrastructure approach to cybersecurity under 
Executive Order 13636 (Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity).96 Dinning of 
the U.S. DOT stresses collaboration and notes a variety of federal, nonprofit, and industry 
working groups in transportation cyber security,97 and GAO’s Wilshusen finds that 
between the public and private sectors, information is available but could be improved.98 
President Obama’s Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative of 2009, while 
focused on the federal enterprise, credits current cooperation between DHS and the 
private sector and calls for further definition of the federal role in extending cybersecurity 
into public and private sector critical infrastructure.99  
2. Insider Threats/Human Error 
Insider threats and human error are concerns in the context of technology. For 
instance, 67 percent of respondents to a 2014 Ponemon Institute survey of 599 global 
information technology (IT) and IT security executives said their companies had 
experienced at least one serious security compromise in the previous year; 24 percent of 
these respondents said the compromises were due to an insider attack or a negligent 
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privileged IT user.100 DuBose, of Kroll Advisory Solutions, cites a number of studies 
with varying numbers but highlights the finding that insiders “are involved in more than 
two-thirds of all cyber cases involving theft of intellectual property.”101 Theft can take 
different forms, such as the case in which an employee of India’s railway admitted that 
the IT office overseeing employees’ financial information used a pirated version of 
Windows operating software—one with known vulnerabilities that could be exploited 
remotely.102  
In addition to IT risks, there are other causes of accidents for rail trains. In one 
example from July 25, 2013, driver error is responsible for the crash of a Spanish high-
speed train that killed at least 80 and injured another 130, as the technology on that track 
could not override the driver’s control.103 Electronic speed controls were subsequently 
installed.104 In an American instance, a disgruntled freight railroad employee drove a 
locomotive without authorization onto the mainline and crashed it into another train.105 
To counter possibilities like this, Japanese railroad representatives respond that 
automated train controls will prevent signal violations and eliminate human error.106 
The use of foreign technology raises questions about the extent of outsourcing to 
be employed with the Texas high-speed train project. Colwill’s writing is representative 
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of the conventional wisdom that outsourcing increases the potential for misbehavior.107 
Other authors note that mitigating techniques are available.108 
3. Conclusion 
As a technology-based project, the proposed Texas high-speed train brings with it 
a range of concerns. Some, like various aspects of cybersecurity, are widely 
acknowledged and written about as they affect critical infrastructure in general, and a 
good amount of information is available in the more specific arena of transportation. 
Some are less frequently discussed in open sources, and these include proprietary 
information because of the privatized nature of the project and the use of foreign 
technology and processes.  
To keep this writing to a manageable length, a number of issues are not included. 
For example, this thesis does not cover implications of electronic reservations and 
ticketing, which may open the system to outside connections and thus increase risk, nor 
does it cover potential concerns regarding the onboard provision of cellphone and Wi-Fi 
service, which may also increase potential entryways for malicious code or transmissions. 
Also outside of the scope of this thesis are explosive detection,109 chemical threats 
similar to the Tokyo Sarin gas incident,110 and deliberate non-interoperability with 
existing rail infrastructure111 requiring a unique system of systems approach. Finally, 
also not included are right of way incursion detection112 and fallout from the disruptive 
nature of the technology.  
                                                 
107 Carl Colwill, “Human Factors in Information Security: The Insider Threat–Who can You Trust 
These Days?” Information Security Technical Report 14, no. 4 (2009): 186–196.          
108 Pravesh Gaonjur, and Chandradeo Bokhoree, Risk of Insider Threats in Information Technology 
Outsourcing: Can Deceptive Techniques be Applied? (Port Louis, Mauritius: University of Technology, 
2006).   
109 Barkakati, and Maurer, Technology Assessment: Explosives Detection.  
110 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2011).    
111 Benzion, “The Facts.”   
112 Justin Yates, Rajan Batta, and Mark Karwan, “Optimal Placement of Sensors and Interception 
Resource Assessment for the Protection of Regional Infrastructure from Covert Attack,” Journal of 
Transportation Security 4, no. 2 (2011): 145–169.  
 32 
C. SECURITY FORCE 
1. Introduction 
No governmental entity will own or operate this train. However, TCR has not 
publicly indicated how it will approach security, law enforcement, or other police 
activities related to the train project. Also, its public statements require some skepticism, 
as the developer’s materials carry a disclaimer noting that plans are subject to change.113 
The provision of security or policing is a key element of a public transportation 
system’s protection. At a minimum, coordination between the police and the 
transportation security system greatly increases the likelihood of success for the system’s 
security.114 The following sections outline what is known about policing practices in 
Japan generally and as might be applied to the TCR system, discusses their potential 
applicability to the Texas project, and makes recommendations regarding optimal 
implementation. 
2. Japan—The Country 
The country of Japan is composed of multiple islands, and its total land mass 
covers about the same area as the state of California (see Figure 4). This small land mass 
supports a population of 127 million, of which 93 percent live in urban areas,115 and land 
is at a premium. For administrative purposes, the country is divided into 47 prefectures 
(somewhat similar to states in the U.S.) with varying degrees of autonomy, size, and 
number of localities/municipalities contained therein. 
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In 1854, Japan and the U.S. reached an agreement allowing American ships into 
Japanese ports for the first time.116 Since that time, Japan and the United States have 
developed independently but participated in many of the same international organizations 
and enjoyed a close cultural and economic relationship, except for some unpleasantness 
in the 1940s. After 9/11, Japan participates in the war on terror and has good 
relationships with American intelligence.117  
Figure 4.  Size Comparison of Japan and the United States 
 
Source: “Japan” [image], CIA World Factbook, accessed November 5, 2015, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/graphics/area 
comparison/JA_area%202014.jpg. 
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3. Japan’s Approach to Policing 
Japan maintains a sizeable police force and military. When necessary for securing 
public order, the military can be used in civil works. That ability became necessary in 
March of 2011, when a massive earthquake occurred in the Pacific close to the Tohoku 
region of northeast Japan.118 The earthquake generated a tsunami of unprecedented 
height—16.7 meters, the height of a four story building—that devastated parts of Japan 
through immediate effect as well as caused the consequential breach of the Fukushima 
nuclear reactor.119 Nobuo Mimura reports, “Over 24 thousand people were reported as 
dead or missing. The Ministry of Defense immediately dispatched assistance, including 
110,000 active and reserve troops and 28,000 police to assist.”120  
The National Police Agency (NPA) is a single agency that serves all of Japan. 
The U.S. does not have a direct counterpart, although as part of its duties, the NPA is 
charged with gathering intelligence much like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
The NPA operates through seven regional police bureaus, the employees which include 
“high ranking officers in prefectural and local police forces.”121  
Prefectural headquarters supervise police stations. The largest police stations 
service Tokyo and Kita-Kyushu, and the smallest serves the remote fishing villages of 
Aomori Prefecture.122 Police stations are organized into sections, including patrol, traffic, 
crime prevention, and criminal investigation. Under each station is a network of “kobans” 
(urban fixed police posts) and/or “chuzaisho” (rural residential posts).  
Japan famously uses a community-based policing method. Urban policeman are 
known for their foot patrols and are addressed by the public as “Omawari-san”—Mr. 
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Walkabout. According to Bayley, patrolling does not lead to discovery of emergencies, 
reduce reaction time, or necessarily enhance availability. Foot patrols create authority 
through visibility and familiarity through face to face interaction. The involvement of 
Japanese policemen in day-to-day civic life goes beyond American crime prevention 
practices. Other activities include “lobbying for the construction of pedestrian overpasses, 
requesting that the sanitation department pick up trash and abandoned items, and asking 
business owners not to serve children during school hours.”123 Even so, patrolmen 
occupy the lowest rung of the police hierarchy.  
4. Transportation in Japan 
Japan has 175 airports, an advanced highway network, and a state of the art intra- 
and intercity rail-based transportation system. The subway network in Tokyo is the 
world’s largest, with 30 separate train lines and 40 miles of tunnels. Moreover, Japanese 
passengers have had high-speed commercial train service as an option since October 1, 
1964. Japan Railways operates eight bullet train routes covering about 1500 miles. The 
top speed presently permitted on the lines is 200 mph.124  
5. Japan’s Experience with Rail Security 
In Japan, high-speed trains do not have a separate intelligence or security 
infrastructure; rather, these are integrated into the mass-transit structure with commuter 
and local trains.125 Passengers boarding trains are not screened. Information about the 
true safety and security practices of Japanese trains is hard to come by, which may be a 
result of the privatized nature of the Japanese rail system. What stands out, however, is 
the sarin gas incident of 1995. 
On the morning of March 20, 1995, hundreds of thousands of commuters boarded 
the Tokyo subways as usual, only this time five members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult 
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joined the crowds on various subway lines. Four of the five carried two bags of sarin each 
while the fifth carried three bags. Sarin is an odorless, highly volatile synthetic nerve 
agent; exposure to it can lead to paralysis, respiratory failure, and death.126 At 8 a.m., the 
cultists punctured the bags with umbrellas and fled the trains. The sarin leaked out of the 
bags and formed pools on the train floors. By day’s end, a dozen people were dead. There 
were over 1400 seriously injured and 4,000 more who needed treatment for exposure to 
Sarin.127 
Initial response was handled by the Tokyo Metropolitan Fire Department 
(TMFD). Of the 1,364 TMFD personnel who responded, 135 became victims themselves 
and required treatment; many had responded without personal protective equipment. The 
Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department (TMPD), which later took charge of the operation 
from the fire department under the supervision of the National Police Agency (NPA), 
mobilized 10,000 officers to increase security and provide crowd control.128 However, 
even though the NPA knew that a hazardous material incident was occurring, trains 
continued to operate, although seven minutes behind schedule. The delay was because of 
the lag involved in one station realizing it had a problem when the train had already 
departed for the next, not due to the subway incident. The NPA eventually combined 
efforts with the military, borrowing hazmat suits and chemical warfare experts.  
While the 1995 sarin gas incident is significant because of its nature and impact, 
for the purposes of this writing, it should be noted that it occurred in the subway, which 
while not a high-speed train, is part of the network that includes all commuter rail 
options.129 Official Japanese materials regarding train safety typically omit this and other 
events or are worded to avoid mentioning them. 
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6. Comparisons between Japan and the United States 
The Posse Comitatus laws in the U.S. allow the use of military troops and 
equipment for only very limited civil purposes. While disaster response is allowed, 
arresting people is not. In addition, the military can and does perform other police 
functions jointly with police agencies, such as Joint Task Force 6’s performance of 
reconnaissance, surveillance, weapons and communications training, and intelligence 
analysis at Fort Bliss, Texas in support of antidrug efforts.130 This situation is unlikely to 
change given the history of the U.S. and the current political climate, particularly given 
the current public backlash against the use of surplus military equipment by civilian 
police forces. 
In spite of this distinct difference in utilization of the military domestically, there 
are sufficient similarities between the United States and Japan as to make it possible to 
import security-related practices from one country to the other. David Bayley, in studying 
Japanese police institutions for possible lessons that could be applicable to the United 
States, wrote that Japan is comparable because it is “modern and affluent, congested and 
urbanized” and that modest differences in “technical capacity, educational levels, wealth, 
or dominant modes of production” do not impair the ability to make comparisons with the 
U.S.131  
There are also differences that could mitigate these similarities. Cultural 
differences include approaches to marriage, parenting, employment, and religious 
practice. There are other differences, which, although seemingly minor, could have 
implications for the provision of security. For example, one study in 1994 found that, 
while face-to-face and telephone communication approaches are similar, American 
information technology workers prefer to communicate over distances using email while 
Japanese preferred fax.132 
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In the public safety arena, both countries have had to address disaster preparation 
and response, have experienced terrorism (including in a rail transportation scenario), and 
have faced somewhat similar policing challenges. There are also some differences in the 
countries’ approaches to a community policing model. First, there is a lack of agreement 
among American practitioners as to exactly what constitutes community policing.133 
Furthermore, there are discrepancies as to how similar policing methods are perceived in 
various American communities, such as in the African-American community, and there 
are aspects of community policing (e.g., visibility) that have unintended negative 
consequences (e.g., increased stop-and-frisks).134 Other differences that could affect 
comparisons include that the Japanese do not treat of domestic violence crimes as a 
police matter.135  
Bayley writes that the Japanese police system was deliberately developed as a 
hierarchical, top-down structure that gives the head of administration almost as much 
prestige as the chief of police. By contrast, American policing is fragmented. For 
instance, Texas alone has over 1900 non-federal law enforcement agencies. Two are the 
main statewide police agencies (Texas Department of Public Safety [DPS] and Texas 
Parks and Wildlife Department [TPWD]), and there are a broad range of state agencies 
with law enforcement powers (e.g., Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission, Health and 
Human Services Commission). At the county level, there are elected sheriffs and 
constables, and at the municipal level police (some of whose chiefs are elected) and 
marshals. Furthermore, many special districts, such as school districts, transit authorities, 
public and private colleges and universities, and others, have law enforcement arms also. 
A number of these are transportation related. For example, the Dallas-Fort Worth 
International Airport is among the 10 largest nonfederal transportation-related agencies 
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for law enforcement in the country, and Harris County (Houston) and Dallas County 
transit authority police departments are in the top 15 on the same list.136  
Regarding public confidence in policing, the Japanese people generally hold their 
police in high regard, which suggests broad acceptance of police processes; however, 
there is at least one quantitative study finding the opposite to be true. The study finds that 
the Japanese may have greater compliance with police but that does not necessarily 
translate into greater confidence.137 The implication of this finding is that any application 
of Japanese practices to U.S. policing would need to be evaluated on the individual 
practice’s merits as opposed to a more general assertion of superiority due to public 
acceptance.  
7. Comparative Analysis of Approaches 
Would the federalized nature of Japan’s National Police Agency be beneficial if 
implemented in the U.S.? There already is something similar in effect in the area of 
railroad policing. Railroads in the U.S. are subject to the federal Transportation Security 
Administration, which can assert authority over public and private transportation systems. 
Like the NPA, the TSA cooperates with regional and local police agencies but can carry 
out its mission unilaterally. As a practical matter, in terms of law enforcement authority 
in relation to high-speed intercity passenger trains, the policing approaches are similar; 
however, most of the TSA’s budget and focus is applied to aviation. While mass transit 
security was heightened after the London subway bombings in 2005, the sense of urgency 
has decreased, and there have been no significant permanent changes in the approach to 
mass transit security.138 
Differences arise in regard to other police actions also. In Japan, there is a more 
hierarchical approach among the police agencies. In contrast, in the U.S., along the route 
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of an intercity train there would be multiple police agencies (i.e., city, county, state, 
federal, special districts like transit authorities, possibly private railroad police) that 
should coordinate closely but may see themselves as competing with each other or 
asserting authority that may or may not exist. In the broader context, there is great 
hesitancy to creating a national police agency, which would have the potential for abuse 
as suggested by some authors, including Naomi Wolf.139 
In Japan, police across the country wear identical uniforms and carry identical 
equipment in identical fashion: pistol on the right hip, handcuffs behind the left hip, 
nightstick by the left leg, and a length of light rope in a trouser pocket. In America, police 
agencies have distinct uniforms and insignia of office, and there may even be variations 
within a given police agency. There are advantages to uniformity of police who are not 
operating undercover in that they are easily recognized by the public across jurisdictions. 
This approach would be beneficial in the case of an intercity transportation mode that 
passes through a number of local jurisdictions as it would let the public know who has 
legal authority and can respond to incidents. In Texas, this would be obvious if the 
uniform is that of a state trooper but less obvious if the officer is from a local agency such 
as the transit districts likely to be found at the nodes of the train network, even though 
those officers may in fact have authority along the entire train network.  
Bayley writes that there are significant differences between Japanese and 
American police in the areas of recruitment, training, pay, supervision, and 
accountability. Analysis of these differences is beyond the scope of this writing, but a 
cursory review does not indicate anything that would create a particular advantage or 
disadvantage regarding high-speed rail security. Bayley’s discussion takes place mostly 
in the context of factors contributing to police misconduct. There are some notable 
differences between the police forces in the two countries, such as the Japanese police 
world is overwhelmingly male; this practice would not be allowed in the U.S. where 
police forces are largely integrated and military forces are becoming more so. The 
uniformity and similarity in training of Japanese police forces, resulting in a 
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standardization of performance in a geographically dispersed, bureaucratic system lends 
itself to a certain sense of community. This is a challenge for the American model of 
multiple overlapping and occasionally competing agencies, which are mostly led by or 
responsible to elected officials, and therefore responsive to the community in a different 
way. Americans would be very suspicious of and opposed to law enforcement agents 
advocating for social or political change as part of their official duties (as opposed to 
police unions or association doing so on their own time).  
The Japanese place a high priority on keeping the infrastructure functioning. For 
example, after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, officials placed a high priority on 
cleaning up and restoring highways within two weeks. Railroads were back on normal 
schedules after about a month and a half.  
The Japanese response to the sarin gas attack also included infrastructure-focused 
changes. Since the sarin gas attack, Japan has removed garbage cans from subway 
platforms, installed elevators as an additional escape route, established emergency 
headquarters facilities, and implemented an educational campaign similar to DHS’s “see 
something, say something.” In addition, surveillance cameras have been installed at 
stations and on trains.140 In addition, under the auspices of the TMFD, hazmat training, 
and response guidelines have been widely promulgated. Direction from the highest levels 
of government has caused the various entities (e.g., police, fire, health, military) to 
cooperate and coordinate future efforts.  
Due to the significant nature of the sarin gas attack, many of these improved 
terrorism prevention and response practices have already been adopted by agencies in the 
United States. However, I have been unable to identify anything in Japan that would be 
analogous to the U.S. Incident Management System, a superior method for coordinating 
agencies across jurisdictions. 
Regarding operation of the train itself, TCR intends to use the system currently in 
place in Japan. These will include practices that are literally foreign to the U.S. because 
of the differences in system design. For example, in Japan the high-speed train tracks are 
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completely separated from freight tracks and road crossings. A special maintenance train 
is run before daily passenger service begins to confirm track and right-of-way 
integrity.141 Adoption of these practices is a given and is not controversial. 
8. Further Options 
Texas law allows the state Department of Public Safety (DPS) to appoint peace 
officers employed by railroad companies through its director.142 The law may need to be 
changed to increase the number of railroad peace officers allowed.  
DPS is authorized to patrol toll roads,143 including doing so through a contract.144 
TCR could contract with DPS for service.145 Less directly, TCR could contract with off-
duty DPS officers acting as private security guards in the same manner as any other 
business does. It is also possible to interpret Chapter 91 of the Texas Transportation Code 
as allowing TCR, through the Texas Department of Transportation, to have DPS provide 
law enforcement.146  
9. Recommendation: Action Items 
Concerns about security were heightened by the June 2015 suicide on board a 
Japanese HSR train and by the death of another passenger and Ayoub El Khazzani’s 
August 2015 attempt to use multiple weapons on the Amsterdam-Paris train à grande 
vitesse (TGV, France’s high-speed train). These concerns require active consideration in 
order to assure the public that the system is safe. It should be noted that ever since a man 
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jumped in front of a bullet train just after the line was opened in 1964, suicide by train 
has been a common occurrence in Japan. The incidents reached 800 successful such 
attempts per year by 2009,147 compared to an annual average 45 suicides in the U.S. 
involving passenger rail.148 These incidents draw public attention, heighten concern, and 
provide a legitimate area for policy consideration; however, the motivation and goal of 
these individuals generally is suicide, not martyrdom, multiple deaths, or terrorism. 
Suicide as a vector for or in combination with terrorism is certainly a possibility, along 
with shooters, car or truck bombs, biological or chemical weapons, or other mechanisms 
of attack. In 2009, there was a foiled suicide attack on a New York subway, and in 2008 
an Al-Shabaab loyalist drove an explosive-laden truck into a government building in 
Somalis, becoming the first known instance of an American citizen conducting a terrorist 
suicide bombing.149 However, as this writing is focused on vulnerabilities and the need 
for regulation as opposed to tactical threats, suicide bombers are not further addressed 
other than as part of generic threats.  
To improve the provision of law enforcement and security regarding the private 
sector high-speed train system, the Texas Legislature should: 
1. Consider whether the decision regarding how law enforcement is 
addressed for the TCR system occurs at the legislative level or at the 
discretion of the private sector corporation. In the absence of legislative 
action, the TCR will make those decisions in a fashion similar to other 
private sector intercity ground transportation providers. The direction 
chosen will affect how much of the Japanese security approach can be 
imported and where the gaps will occur.  
2. Require verification that the planned design, construction, operation, and 
maintenance incorporate state-of-the-art security provisions no less than 
those currently practiced in Japan. The project is represented as using the 
system as it is in Japan, where proven security protocols are integrated 
into every aspect, including cyber systems, ticketing, and train control. 
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However, TCR has stated conditions may change, so it is necessary not to 
assume preparations in the area of security.  
3. Task the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) with carrying out these 
actions in cooperation with other affected agencies and establish a Joint 
Legislative Oversight Committee to monitor implementation and receive 
regular reports regarding potential shortcomings. Since the Japanese top-
down policing from the federal level is unlikely to be successful in the 
American context, the DPS is the logical point of coordination because as 
the statewide police agency whose jurisdiction includes rail and 
intelligence (although not exclusively) and whose force is regularly in 
every county, DPS is well positioned to provide enforcement or coordinate 
with the chosen enforcers and local agencies.  
4. Should TCR determine to establish its own police force, require 
cooperation among that force and the various law enforcement and 
emergency response entities with jurisdiction over the train or its route. 
One lesson of the sarin gas incident is the importance of awareness, 
coordination, and practice among those who could be called upon in an 
emergency. 
5. Require evidence that community sensitivities are taken into account in 
the establishment or importation of policing practices. If the community 
policing approach is adopted, the cultural diversity of the proposed train 
route necessitates consideration of customs and concerns.  
6. If TCR employs its own police force, require its officers to wear 
distinctive uniforms and prohibit the implementation of practices such as 
political advocacy (which are beyond those currently authorized to 
American police agencies). Implementation of the Japanese practices 
regarding uniforms and political advocacy are significant departures from 
current practice and would require study and discussion before taking any 
further. 
7. Study the potential for Japanese-style integration of high-speed rail trains 
into the commuter rail security system. Do this in recognition of the 
challenge presented by the interface between public and private systems 
and the physical separation of the high-speed train from grade crossings 
and freight rail lines as well as the multiple law enforcement jurisdictions 
involved. Finally, the potential benefits, as demonstrated by the safety 
record of the Japanese mass transit system, would require significant 
coordination at from all levels of government and the private sector along 
the TCR system’s route. 
These recommendations will enable the state to ensure its citizens’ safety by allowing the 
private sector effort to make certain decisions regarding its approach to law enforcement, 
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employing methods that have proven effective in daily practice in Japan, limiting 
Japanese practices where they are incompatible with American systems and culture, and 
employing lessons learned in Japanese police practice as appropriate.  
D. INFORMATION SHARING 
TCR faces many challenges in providing security for its HSR project. One 
challenge is how the company can best protect its investment and passengers through the 
efficient gathering and sharing of information about possible threats (intel). TCR will 
certainly be acquiring intel in the course of its business operations. So will public and 
private law enforcement entities, transit providers, and other critical infrastructure entities 
in the region. Terrorism prevention will depend on how well intel is collected, compared, 
analyzed, and resolved. 
1. Importance of Intel to High-Speed Rail 
Having good intel is critical.150 Of 15 planned attacks against public 
transportation between 1997 and 2010, 11 were uncovered by intel151 as was a 2013 
Canadian passenger train plot.152 In addition, intel has been critical in stopping high-
speed rail terrorist plots.153 DHS believes that long-distance, passenger train systems 
should have “access to robust information-sharing networks that include relevant intel 
and threat analysis and real-time incident reporting.”154 When the DHS inspector general 
criticized Amtrak for not focusing more on hardening rail stations, TSA responded that 
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Amtrak’s operational activities, including intel, are “just as important” in critical 
infrastructure protection.155 
Nextgov cites former officials as finding shortcomings in the way intel is 
currently developed and employed for the protection of critical infrastructure. According 
to Sternstein: 
While government and critical industry sectors have made strides in 
sharing threat intelligence, less attention has been paid to translating those 
analyses into usable information for the people in the trenches, who are 
running the subways, highways and other transit systems, some former 
federal officials say.156  
The State of Texas will not own or operate this train or its stations, so its responsibilities 
are limited, but regardless of the adequacy of private sector efforts, government has a 
compelling role regarding all critical infrastructure protection, through collaboration, 
regulation, or both.157 
2. The Japanese Approach 
In Japan, high-speed rail trains do not have a separate intel or security 
infrastructure; rather, they are integrated into the mass-transit structure with commuter 
and local trains.158 Passengers boarding trains are not screened, but surveillance cameras 
were installed at stations and on trains after the 1995 sarin gas attacks.159  
After 9/11, Japan participated in the war on terror and is seen to have good 
relationships with American intelligence.160 Additionally, the CEO of TCR is reportedly 
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a former CIA officer posted to Tokyo161 and later the Bush administration’s top defense 
policymaker for Asia162 who can be expected to have good ties in both the American and 
Japanese intel communities. 
3. Options for Efficient Intel 
Fusion centers enable relationships necessary for intel.163 At least two of Texas’s 
seven fusion centers are in the train’s service area (Dallas and Houston) and one has 
statewide jurisdiction, the Texas Joint Crime Information Center (JCIC) in Austin).164 
Centers will need to collaborate, not compete. TCR has several options with regard to 
how it provides security that will affect how efficiently the railroad can share intel. These 
are listed in the sections that follow.  
a. Option 1: Standard Intercity Passenger Security  
TSA has broader reporting requirements than states do.165 The TSA by federal 
rule receives intel and significant concerns about security from the rail security 
coordinator (RSC) for each passenger railroad.166 . However, TSA may withhold from 
state and local governments an RSC’s identity and contact information.167 Private 
intercity bus lines coordinate with local police and are eligible for DHS bus security  
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grants168 (there are similar grants for rail169 but Amtrak is the only eligible entity170). 
TCR could approach security in the same manner as intercity buses. TSA’s security can 
range from random checks to airline-style checkpoints, but the president of TCR has 
rejected “TSA-type security.”171 While public transit agencies can employ their own 
peace officers,172 TCR does not fit the current legal definition of public transit agency. 
TCR might be able to rely on existing transit police at terminals but these officers would 
be limited to their home agencies’ geographic jurisdiction without a change in law and 
their participation in fusion centers is unknown as of this writing.  
b. Option 2: Private Rail Police 
As noted earlier, Texas law allows the state Department of Public Safety (DPS) to 
appoint peace officers employed by railroad companies through its director.173 TCR 
would need to establish relationships and communication mechanisms, which under this 
scenario could occur through fusion centers’ private sector outreach. The law may need 
to be changed to increase the number of railroad peace officers allowed. Railroads are 
represented on DHS critical infrastructure boards, and the Joint Crime Information Center 
(JCIC) in Austin, as the official Texas state fusion center, has a critical infrastructure 
protection component that emphasizes involvement of the private sector.174  
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c. Option 3: Texas Department of Public Safety 
As noted earlier, DPS is authorized to patrol toll roads,175 including doing so 
through a contract.176 TCR could contract with DPS for service with a direct connection 
to the state fusion center to avoid concerns about private sector involvement in fusion 
centers177—regardless of their validity.178 Less directly, TCR could contract with off-
duty DPS officers acting as private security guards in the same manner as any other 
business does; this would have the benefit of informal personal networks. It is also 
possible to interpret Chapter 91 of the Texas Transportation Code as allowing TCR, 
through the Texas Department of Transportation, to have DPS provide law 
enforcement.179  
4. Conclusion 
Potential threats to HSR require efficient intel and careful consideration of TCR’s 
approach to law enforcement. TCR’s setup and management provide a ready level of 
interaction with intel, but since DPS is responsible for the Texas Fusion Center,180 the 
most efficient course would be for TCR to participate with DPS in its various intel 
programs for the private sector.  
E. PROTECTIVE MEASURES ASSESSMENT 
The train is a potential target for terrorists. As a detailed study of hard 
(infrastructure) and soft (human or other non-infrastructure) protective measures is 
beyond the scope of this writing, this section examines whether and how the company 
can anticipate and prepare for a singular, well known aspect of terrorism: the 
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psychological effects of terrorism upon employees, customers, emergency responders, 
and residents along the train’s path. It looks at pre-event, event, and post-event 
considerations.  
1. Potential Impact of an Act of Terrorism—Financial 
In addition to the immediate physical injuries, fatalities, or property damage that 
occur in an act of terrorism, there are likely to be other negative effects, including 
financial impacts. While the various studies can occasionally be contradictory in aspects, 
they are generally in agreement the negative effects of a terrorism incident continue for 
some duration after the incident. 
After the events of September 11, 2001, there was a significant decline in the 
number of people choosing to fly. According to one set of researchers, the result was both 
“a negative transitory shock of over 30% and an ongoing negative demand shock 
amounting to roughly 7.4% of pre-September 11th demand.”181 These effects went 
through at least 2003 and are unlikely to be attributable to outside factors, such as the 
general economy, the Iraq war, or the SARS outbreak.182 The implementation of baggage 
screening has led to a five to eight percent reduction in people flying.183 Several airlines 
approached bankruptcy and were only saved by federal intervention.184 Blalock, 
Kadiyali, and Simon estimate “the substitution of driving for flying by those seeking to 
avoid security inconvenience alone likely led to over 100 road fatalities.”185 
The airlines of the planes that crashed in 9/11 were sued by families and 
businesses, and these lawsuits resulted in further financial losses. Cantor Fitzgerald, a 
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New York brokerage firm, settled its lawsuit with American Airlines for $135 million.186 
Additionally, United Airlines settled a lawsuit with at least one family for an undisclosed 
sum.187 From a standpoint solely of financial considerations, a corporation, at a 
minimum, would have a duty to its shareholders to act upon the possibility of terrorist 
acts by taking steps to prevent such acts.  
2. Potential Impact of an Act of Terrorism—Behavioral 
The purpose of terrorism is to instill dread, reduce confidence in government 
structures, and create a “fearful state of mind in an audience far wider than the immediate 
victims.” It is “political warfare on a psychological field of battle.”188  
In natural disasters, unintentional man-made disasters, and incidents of terrorism, 
society experiences a disruption of normalcy and safety, both in the immediate area and 
in a wider context.189 However, incidents of terrorism have some qualities that 
distinguish them from natural disasters and unintentional man-made disasters. The 
potential impact of terrorism is greater and more severe than other disasters because of 
these qualities and their effects on “distress responses, behavioral change, and psychiatric 
illness.”190 For example, terroristic events are committed on purpose with the desired 
outcomes of injuries, damage, attention, and fear to achieve political ends. These events 
are largely unpredictable, although the list of potential targets can be narrowed through 
an examination of significance, vulnerability, and threat. Another quality of terrorism that 
sets it apart from other disasters is that prevention may be possible.  
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Like financial changes, behavioral changes from terrorism may also be long 
lasting. According to David Myers, there are four key drivers of fear: what we are 
historically predisposed to fear, what we cannot control, what is immediate, and what is 
most readily available in memory, especially if tied to a horrific image or images.191 A 
quality of terrorism is that it excels in at least three of these areas.  
As a result of the Tokyo sarin gas attack of 1995, a dozen people died, over 1400 
were seriously injured and 4,000 more needed treatment for chemical exposure. 
According to records, “sixty percent of the victims also had to be treated for post-
traumatic stress disorder.”192 Two years after the event, survivors continued to report 
“symptoms such as fear of subways (32 percent), sleep disturbances (29 percent), 
flashbacks (16 percent), and irritability (10 percent).”193 Victims presented somatic and 
psychological symptoms five years after the event.194  
Furthermore, psychological effects have been known to contribute to or be 
significant risk factors for physical ailments, including chronic diseases and the 
relationship between stress and heart disease. Trauma can “affect everyday behavior, 
including social and individual behaviors related to half of all causes of U.S. morbidity 
and mortality.”195 Thus, an act of terrorism could have negative financial, physical, and 
behavioral effects.  
3. Potential Victims 
Taylor identified six categories of potential victims of terrorist attacks:  
Those who are adversely affected at the epicenter of a disaster, their 
families and close friends, the emergency workers and those whose jobs 
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oblige them to become directly involved in the rescue and recovery 
operations, the grieving community that identifies with those who are 
suffering, the psychologically troubled whose reactions are exacerbated, 
along with troublemakers who are inclined to exploit the situation and use 
it to their own advantage.196  
Taylor also includes various other people who are adversely affected.197 
Should a train be the subject of a terrorist attack, it can be expected there would 
be psychological impacts for anyone involved in or anyone who perceives they could 
have been involved in the incident. This list includes physically affected victims, people 
in close proximity but not directly affected, first responders, employees of the company, 
and people living or working along the route of the train. It could also include a wide 
array of others: people indirectly or remotely affected, such as those seeing pictures of 
the event through broadcast or social media; those whose livelihoods are impacted by 
economic effects of the incident; and those with some affinity to the incident through 
knowing, being related to a victim, or by perceiving the attack as being on a broader 
social identity group, such as Texans. These groups will experience vulnerability and the 
potential for negative psychological outcomes. The may be substantial variation in the 
kind of vulnerability, and the presence and extent of vulnerability may not be readily 
apparent.198 Furthermore, the effects will vary given proximity to an incident and how 
prepared an individual is to experience such an incident.  
Generally, people who experience traumatic stress react by having negative 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. For instance, they may experiences common 
psychological effects, including difficulty concentrating and remembering as well as 
having recurring images and dreams of the disaster. Additionally, common feelings 
people may have include fear and anxiety, sound and smell triggers, irritability, 
hopelessness, and depression. Furthermore, common behaviors of people may include 
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being overprotective, hyper-alert and startling easily, and crying for no apparent 
reason.199  
In the Tokyo sarin gas incident, people who were not in the area of the incident 
and had no rational reason to believe they had been victims of this or any related attack 
sought treatment.200 About three quarters of those who sought medical care showed no 
effects of exposure to sarin.201 Fear and anxiety led these “worried well” to consume 
health resources that were otherwise needed and engaged. Their arrival at hospitals 
actually exposed them to hazards they would not otherwise have experienced because the 
time lag in diagnosing sarin led to a secondary exposure in the hospital setting as sarin 
gas was released from the skin, clothing, and hair of the victims awaiting treatment. Also, 
due to inadequate diagnosis and lack of proper personal protective equipment, at least 12 
doctors showed symptoms of secondary exposure.202  
Effects on emergency providers, such as law enforcement, first responders, pre-
hospital and hospital, and fire, are pronounced and extend beyond those directly impacted 
to include those indirectly involved. Impacts are felt differently by different special 
groups.203 Special groups could be defined by age (e.g., children), culture, ethnicity, 
socioeconomic status, gender, and possibly history of psychiatric illness.204 Some 
researchers include in the emergency responder category those utility workers involved in 
immediate service restoration, such as electricity and water.205  
Incidents on trains and in train stations specifically are challenging because they 
are confined spaces with large numbers of people and few limitations on presence or 
travel. The “flight” option of the fight-or-flight choice is constrained—by confined 
spaces, by the number of other people, or both. Additionally, train movement and related 
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activity, such as route maintenance, happen on regular, known schedules. As seen in 
Japan, disruptions would affect not just one train and its occupants but also subsequent 
trains and passengers, feeders systems, such as parking and transit, first responders, local 
health networks, and corporate personnel.  
For the government, responsibility to provide support to disaster victims and their 
families, including related preparatory measures, falls initially to the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The NTSB Transportation Disaster Assistance 
Division coordinates all levels of government and non-governmental groups as well as 
liaising with the carrier in addressing the issues of those affected.206  
4. Recommendations 
While the ability to predict the exact effects of terroristic acts has proven elusive, 
there is general agreement that there are behavioral and psychological impacts of 
terrorism in addition to the physical damage. A goal of minimizing these impacts would 
suggest that emergency, medical, public health, and psychological management steps 
should be taken preparing for an event, in responding to an event, and in recovering from 
an event.207  
First, just as planners are budgeting for and planning the logistics of traveler 
safety through such efforts as train and station design, purchase of onboard first aid 
equipment, and arrangements with first responders along the route, they should also 
include psychological and mental health in those preparations. The psychological 
consequences of an act of terrorism are likely to affect economic resiliency as well as 
emotional well-being beyond those physically involved.208 
The corporation should actively anticipate and plan for mental needs by 
determining what role it will take and what role the public sector, private sector (e.g., 
private medical facilities), and nonprofit sectors are willing to perform, then assessing the 
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relative abilities and any gaps in the desired level of service. First responders in particular 
should be trained in mental health as specifically applied in disasters, including the 
notable features resulting from terrorism. Community services at train stations and along 
the route, such as public and private healthcare providers and facilities and even 
treatment centers for substance abuse, should be identified and mapped along with their 
normal and surge capacities, which could then be compared with train passenger loads to 
reveal potential service shortages that should be addressed. This approach will be more 
effective if communities are invited and actively participate in the pre-event planning 
process.  
The corporation should also plan for accurate and timely communication with the 
public and authorities during and after events. Resulting benefits should include a 
reduction in instances of people whose health is not affected but they think it might be—
the so-called worried well—attempting to access the system and overwhelming its 
capabilities. In addition, the corporation should consider an appropriate and effective pre-
event risk communication strategy. This strategy could include instructions designed to 
limit the likelihood of a terrorist attack (e.g., see something say something) and to 
anticipate and limit confusion and uncertainty during and after the event (e.g., active 
shooter scenario behavior, first aid information, how to exit, where to gather, and how to 
locate loved ones in an emergency).  
To address employee wellness, the corporation should consider incorporating 
mental health protocols into business continuity plans. These protocols might include 
planning for off-site family support centers, an employee locator system, and alternate 
power systems for during and post-incident activity.209 
5. Conclusion 
The potential for serious psychological impacts from a terrorist attack on the 
proposed Texas Central Railway high-speed train merits appropriate planning and 
preparation. Certain steps can be taken to reduce the impact on the corporation, its 
shareholders, customers, and the public.  
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F. DEPENDENCIES 
Passenger transportation systems depend on other sectors for necessary inputs that 
they cannot or will not provide themselves. The DHS National Protection and Programs 
Directorate, Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis has identified sectors on which 
mass transit particularly relies. According to DHS:  
Mass transit systems are dependent on these Sectors [energy, emergency 
services, communications, information technology, and financial services] 
to maintain daily operations; provide power, oil and gas; data 
communications, including the exchange of industrial control system data 
that integrates different functions (e.g., operations, location tracking, 
emergency alarms, fire detection, gas monitoring); emergency response 
and recovery; and daily financial transactions.210 
1. SCADA/Train Control 
With the Stuxnet incident having received wide media coverage and industry 
concern211 and at least one additional incident causing significant destruction at an 
industrial facility in Germany,212 there is extensive responsive literature addressing 
“supervisory control and data acquisition” (SCADA, defined as “a generic name for a 
computerized system that is capable of gathering and processing data and applying 
operational controls to geographically dispersed assets over long distances”).213 SCADA 
is generally recognized as presenting cyber vulnerabilities; however, there is 
disagreement regarding the extent of the vulnerability in the rail transportation world. A 
report in the New York Times stated that then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told an 
audience, “An aggressor nation or extremist group could use these kinds of cyber tools to 
gain control of critical switches…. They could derail passenger trains, or even more 
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dangerous, derail passenger trains loaded with lethal chemicals.”214 It should be noted 
that the existence of “passenger trains loaded with lethal chemicals” would be hyperbole 
at best and alarming otherwise, but in this instance, it appears to be a reporting error by 
the New York Times that was repeated by many other outlets, including UPI.215 A review 
of a video of the event216 and the official transcript prepared by the Department of 
Defense217 reveals that the reference to trains loaded with lethal chemicals meant freight 
trains, not passenger trains.  
Mass transit (passenger rail) and freight rail both use SCADA systems to control 
such things as track direction, railroad signals, switches, and automated control 
processes.218 Unlike freight rail’s flexible and difficult to predict schedule, long-distance 
passenger trains run on published schedules with little tolerance for variation. For 
instance, the average delay time for a Shinkansen train in Japan is a minute or less, and 
the turnaround time for the Shinkansen at Tokyo Station, which handles 300 trains per 
day with four tracks and two platforms, is 12 minutes.219 The Japanese Shinkansen uses 
an extensive network of automated train and traffic control systems.220 Figure 5 shows 
the Integrated Intelligent Transport Management System Computerized Safety, 
Maintenance, and Operation Systems (COSMOS of Shinkansen).  
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Source: Nishiyama, High-Speed Rail Operations in Japan.  
In America, in August of 2011, the hacker collective Anonymous breached 
cybersecurity at Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) of San Francisco and released personal 
information regarding over one hundred BART police officers.221 Security officers at 
Class I railroads are quick to acknowledge this breach and point out that it involved 
business records, not any operational or control circuits.222  
This incident notwithstanding, the potential for operational disruption does exist. 
Such a thing happened in Poland in 2008. A Polish teenager altered a television remote 
control and was able to redirect trams in Lodz as if it were “a giant train set,” derailing 
four trams and injuring 12 people.223 According to former TSA Administrator Kip 
Hawley, “They are in better communication with trains than airlines are with their 
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airplanes.”224 Hawley was speaking about freight railroads, but his point is applicable to 
the technology in question; railroads are in constant communication with their trains and 
even have control over them. Knowledge of cyber threats pertaining to railway networks 
is hampered though, according to Wijesekera of George Mason University’s Center for 
Infrastructure Protection, because existing American railway networks “do not have 
mechanisms for the comprehensive, secure, centralized collection of forensic data.”225 
Brito and Watkins note that Clarke and Knake, in the 2010 best seller Cyber War, 
describe the derailment of trains as a possible outcome of a cyber war scenario. However, 
Brito and Watkins believe any such threat is overstated, as the Clarke-Knake scenario is 
based on “distributed denial of service” attacks (DDOS). In addition, Brito and Watkins 
are skeptical that a DDOS attack would be sufficient to derail a train.226 Dumont 
disagrees, however, suggesting attacks would go beyond DDOS to include reconfiguring 
instructions, data, or code.227 Aliya Sternstein, writing in NextGov and citing a TSA 
memo, wrote that foreign hackers were able to control signals and disrupt train traffic on 
a freight railroad for two days in 2011. However, the industry adamantly disputes the 
accuracy of the TSA memo, holding that the incident described did not occur, and DHS 
appears to be distancing itself from the memo.228 However, Robert Turk of the Idaho 
National Laboratory wrote that CSX Transportation has acknowledged a worm that in 
2003 infected its communication system, “affecting the dispatching and signaling 
systems such that all passenger and freight traffic, including morning commuter traffic in 
the Washington, D.C., area, had to be stopped for about 12 hours.”229 
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Will there be real-time communication with or control from Japan? This may 
improve efficiency but create vulnerability. Paul Rosenzweig notes the important 
connection between the cyber world and the physical, citing that a 2006 earthquake off 
the coast of Taiwan cut six of seven undersea telecommunications cables, disrupting 
Internet traffic to Japan and several other countries.230  
2. Energy and Electrical 
TCR’s proposal involves an all-electrically powered system. There are parallels 
between the train project and the electrical grid itself. Production, transmission, and sale 
of electricity are primarily private sector activities. The electric power system has 
historically been both a war and peacetime target, with numerous instances of attack by 
state and non-state actors around the world. The electric grid serves a public purpose and 
its protection is in the public’s interest.  
One major difference between the electrical system and the high-speed train is the 
effect of a successful terrorist attack. Immediate injuries and fatalities are more likely on 
the train or at any of the train’s key points (e.g., stations, trainset, right-of-way) whereas a 
grid failure could indirectly lead to injuries or fatalities through loss of critical health 
support systems, traffic control devices, and perhaps prolonged loss of power to 
refrigeration, air conditioning, and heating units.231 Still, as this is not a new threat, 
hospitals and other sensitive energy users have access to backup generators, distributed 
generation, and other methods that can stave off damage to human life in all but the most 
widespread and prolonged disruptions.232  
Another major difference is that there is little uniformity or standardization 
among the various pieces of the grid. A wide variety of suppliers and manufacturers are 
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available that can supply the necessary equipment233 except possibly high voltage 
transformers, which are not manufactured in this country and can take many months to 
manufacture.234 This heterogeneity creates complexity and multiple potential points of 
failure within the system, but it also increases the possibility that, in the event of failure, a 
substitute can be found or quickly implemented. By contrast, the proposed high-speed 
train is a homogenous system that has been tested and refined in daily use; however, 
major components, such as railcars, do not currently have suppliers in the U.S. In 
addition, contingency plans would need to take into consideration the relative merits of 
maintaining inventories of parts versus the time required to receive shipments from 
Japan.  
Various technological concerns regarding electrical power are inherent in the 
project, as the train is powered by electrical power supplied by overhead catenary 
cable.235 Electricity brings with it high-tech issues such as SCADA,236 vulnerabilities 
including cyberattack, physical attack, directed energy weapons, geomagnetically 
induced currents, and severe weather.237 Electricity also brings lower-tech issues such as 
in the Arkansas incident where a determined vandal pulled powerlines down over some 
tracks far enough that a train snagged them.238 This is a particularly noteworthy item as 
the proposed project seeks to share right-of-way with existing roads and utilities.239 Light 
rail systems and subways typically do not have backup electrical power systems beyond 
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emergency lighting.240 The proposed train, its control systems, and the grid are also 
potentially vulnerable to natural or man-made electromagnetic pulse.241 Finally, there are 
likely to be implications for energy use and air quality as passenger rail systems around 
the world move to generated electricity as a power source,242 but that discussion is 
beyond the scope of this writing.  
3. Positive Train Control 
Federal law requires intercity passenger trains to use positive train control—a 
designation for a system of computer processors communicating over wired or wireless 
networks to control train speed and movements.243 There are a variety of architectures or 
approaches that could be used to implement positive train control, which is intended to 
reduce or eliminate collisions. However, due to a variety of factors and complications, 
most American freight and commuter railroads have not fully implemented positive train 
control. Estimates for full implementation are no earlier than 2017 and possibly even 
2020 or later.244 
Japanese trains currently use a positive train control-like process.245 TCR has not 
said how its process will comply or vary from legally required processes in the U.S. 
Positive train control does increase safety, but it is at the possible expense of 
cybersecurity due to an increased reliance on radio frequencies and computer software 
controlled systems. Railroad computer systems have proven to be vulnerable to cyber 
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threats. In one incident from 2011, hackers accessed Bay Area Rapid Transit computer 
systems and stole customer and employee information.246 In another, the TSA at least 
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IV. PROBABILITY AND FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Previous chapters have addressed the potential for acts of terrorism and the 
possible outcomes or consequences of such acts. The worst possible outcomes would 
include deaths and physical destruction that would have a negative effect on public 
opinion, disrupt train operation, create expense on the parts of responding entities, and 
have a negative economic effect on the corporation and related activities. This chapter 
addresses the question of the potential (or likelihood or probability) of such an act 
happening. This is the third piece of the three pieces that typically are combined to 
represent risk.248  
B. QUALITATIVE VERSUS QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES 
Measuring risk involves identifying an event type and determining the frequency 
of that event, the severity of the outcome, which can be measured using fatalities, 
injuries, physical damage, business lost due to shutdowns or delays, and other impacts, 
and then attempting to project that into the future. Understanding the probability of an 
event is a necessary component of risk analysis because, combined with action and 
consequence, it allows a comparison of threats and vulnerabilities and, therefore, a format 
for decision making regarding the allocation of scarce resources. For the HSR system, 
this could mean choosing among various security options, such as fortifying stations, 
right-of-way surveillance, intrusion detection systems, and cyber protection. It could also 
mean balancing security with measures that increase passenger through-put, and ideally, 
it facilitates such federal activities as the award of security grants.249 However, even that 
use should be tempered with some subjective or political factors that take into account 
factors such as the value to a terrorist organization of a successful strike. If one only 
compared transit to car travel on the basis of death rates, one would focus safety efforts 
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on automobile travel. According to Todd Litman, using U.S. death rate by mode 
statistics, “Even including terrorist attacks and other crimes against transit passengers, 
transit is far safer than private vehicle travel.”250 
At its most basic level, estimating probabilities requires the identification of 
necessary or contributing factors and evaluating their place in a qualitative analysis. A 
more advanced approach is to identify historical, cultural, and other markers that can be 
used to develop a quantitative analysis. In theory, these analyses can become quite 
granular, comparing a variety of types of attacks (e.g., long guns, explosives, cyber, 
chemicals) at a variety of locations (e.g., outside stations, inside stations, under bridges) 
at different times of the week or day (e.g., first train out, rush hour).  
The more quantitative the approach, the greater the ability to compare subtly 
nuanced and finely detailed scenarios. However, the user of these methods should be 
aware of the potential shortcomings because they also could have consequences. The first 
and most obvious shortcoming is that they all involve predicting the future, a dicey 
proposition under the best of circumstances. Our ability to do so as relates to terrorism 
has had some successes but some notably spectacular failures.  
Not only do these analyses require predicting the future, but quantitative 
approaches that use historical data mean predicting the future based on past terrorist 
incidents. Yet, one hallmark of terrorism is that while certain markers do tend to be 
constant (e.g., pre-operational surveillance, selection of soft targets) others change, seem 
to vacillate, or evolve (e.g., law enforcement/military or civilians as targets, methods, and 
tempo of communication, recruitment). Also, the more granular the analysis, the fewer 
historical incidents are available, and therefore, the margin of error is likely to increase. 
As well, there may be many options as to which measures are chosen for comparison 
(e.g., public mass transit, intercity trains, intercity high-speed trains; U.S., countries with 
HSR, worldwide; total track miles, passenger train miles, passenger miles).  
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A study attempting to compare the safety of rural and urban areas using car 
crashes would find quantitatively more crashes in cities than in the countryside and 
conclude the countryside is safer. Yet, as Jeff Speck wrote in a Twitter post on November 
19, 2015, “FYI, if this map showed collisions per capita, it would be the opposite. Cities 
much safer than suburbs or country.”251 Furthermore, as the Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency simply stated, “The method for probability assessment chosen affects the use of 
the analysis results.”252 This topic falls under a developing field of research called 
“probabilistic terrorism risk assessment,”253 which is seeing a lively internal debate 
regarding various methods and their effects on outcomes. For example, writing about 
nuclear power plant vulnerability, Peplow, Sulfredge, Sanders, and Morris offer modified 
approaches, stating:  
The results of vulnerability analysis are greatly influenced by the 
computational approaches used. Standard approximations used in fault-
tree analysis are not applicable for attacks, where high component failure 
probabilities are expected…. Different blast modeling approaches can also 
affect the end results. Modeling the structural details of facility buildings 
and the geometric layout of components within the buildings is required to 
yield meaningful results.254 
There will also be conditions, externalities, and items difficult to quantify that 
could change the outcomes. To the extent that the train as proposed is a closed system, in 
that it does not interact with freight tracks or rely on outside systems beyond those noted 
in the chart of dependencies, the potential for disruption is reduced. To the extent that 
redundancies and fail safes are built into the system, as is likely given what can be 
learned from public information about the Japanese experience, the possibility of normal 
accidents or disruptions leading to catastrophic failures is reduced.  
                                                 
251 “Twitter Post, 8:29 PM November 19, 2015,” last modified November 19, 2015, accessed 
November 21, 2015, https://twitter.com/JeffSpeckAICP/status/667530285844680704.  
252 Erikkson, and Juhl, Guide to Risk and Vulnerability Analyses, 45.  
253 Mark G. Stewart et al., “Probabilistic Terrorism Risk Assessment and Risk Acceptability for 
Infrastructure Protection,” Australian Journal of Structural Engineering 13, no. 1 (2012): 2.  
254 Douglas E. Peplow et al., “Calculating Nuclear Power Plant Vulnerability using Integrated 
Geometry and Event/Fault-Tree Models,” Nuclear Science and Engineering 146, no. 1 (2004): 71.  
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C. POTENTIAL DATA SOURCES 
The Mineta Transportation Institute maintains the Database of Terrorist and 
Serious Criminal Attacks Against Public Surface Transportation, that contains historical 
information on several thousand incidents, broken down using over 50 different types of 
targets and plots.255 However, this database is proprietary and not available to the general 
public for queries, so findings using its data cannot be corroborated without special 
clearance.  
The University of Maryland and the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) maintain the Global Terrorism 
Database,256 which can be queried by the public online at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 
The Global Terrorism Database catalogs over 6000 transportation incidents as opposed to 
the 3000 incidents in the Mineta database.257 Strandberg used the Global Terrorism 
Database to identify 3,955 terrorist attacks against public transportation, of which 1,122 
involve rail.258 However, the Global Terrorism Database does not break down the target 
or attack details to the extent Mineta does.  
The Federal Railroad Administration’s Office of Safety Analysis provides a 
publicly accessible database of freight and passenger railroad operations. The database 
includes incident and casualty information and can be viewed, queried, and downloaded 
online at http://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/OfficeofSafety/default.aspx.   
D. FAULT TREES 
For complex systems, fault trees are a visual diagramming method of identifying 
points in the system that are most prone to failure or more critical due to their role in a 
potential failure. Fault trees can be devised using the system pieces identified through the 
                                                 
255 “Factsheet-MTI Database,” HS University, last modified September 2013, accessed November 22, 
2015, http://www.hsuniversityprograms.org/default/assets/File/Factsheet-MTI database-FINAL-as of 
Sept2013.pdf.  
256 Gary LaFree, and Laura Dugan, “Introducing the Global Terrorism Database,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 19, no. 2 (2007): 181–204.  
257 “Factsheet-MTI Database,” HS University.  
258 Veronica Strandberg, “Rail Bound Traffic: A Prime Target for Contemporary Terrorist Attacks?” 
Journal of Transportation Security 6, no. 3 (2013): 274.    
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major components approach, and each component can be further broken down into 
subcomponents and sub-subcomponents to provide a greater ability to analyze potential 
areas of vulnerability.  
The worst possible outcome for this project would be a terrorist act and a 
catastrophic failure of systems involving deaths and physical destruction that would have 
a negative effect on public opinion, disrupt train operation, create expense on the parts of 
responding entities, and have a negative economic effect on the corporation and related 
activities. A fault tree analysis allows a structured consideration of the potential sub-
system failures that could factor into a catastrophic system failure. Figure 6 illustrates a 
proposed set of interconnections among subsystems for this analysis.  
Figure 6.  HSR Fault Tree 
 
 
In the proposed approach, a catastrophic train system failure could result from 
three key sources: physical damage to the system, failures of interconnected systems that 
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the train system depends on, or failures in the security system. These sources appear as 
the first level below the OR gate in Figure 6. In this example, actions sufficient to create 
catastrophic failure through physical damage could occur in the areas of weather, cyber/
information technology, sabotage, or maintenance. Actions sufficient to create 
catastrophic failure through failure of dependencies could occur in the energy/electrical 
or communications areas. For a securities system failure sufficient to bring the entire 
system down, actions in either the security force or security management areas by 
themselves would not be sufficient, but failures in both areas must occur, hence the AND 
gate at the second level in Figure 6. Each of these system threats could be further 
evaluated, creating additional branches in the fault tree. The proposed tree is not meant to 
be exhaustive but to illustrate the approach.  
Further analysis can be conducted within the sub-areas. For example, Figure 7 
shows a subset of items that could be vulnerable to sabotage.  
Figure 7.  Fault Tree for Sabotage 
 
 
In Figure 7, sufficient damage could occur at track locations or at any station to 
bring about overall system failure. As the number of track miles or stations increase, the 
Sabotage 
Tracks 




possible points of failure increase, and therefore the probability of failure, all other things 
being equal, would increase.  
A useful exercise at this point might be to calculate an exceedance probability. 
Exceedance probability uses historical data to calculate the odds of a certain occurrence 
happening. Occurrences of concern in this example happen either along the track or at a 
station. According to published sources, the TCR project will initially have one station in 
Houston,259 at least one in Dallas, and one near Shiro to serve Bryan/College Station and 
Huntsville260 for a total of at least three.  
The formula for determining the probability of successful sabotage then depends 
on the probability of track failure multiplied by the probabilities of failure of any given 
station:  
 
1 − Pf( )= (1− Pf − track )(1− Pf −station1)(1 − Pf −station2)...(1 − Pf −station−n )  
where Pf is the overall probability of successful sabotage (failure probability), Pf-track is 
the probability of track failure, and Pf-station is the probability of failure of any given 
station.  
Developing an exceedance probability for track failure requires calculating 
terrorist incidents per mile of track to calculate an incident per mile measure. That 
number could further be refined using consequence data (fatalities/injuries). However, 
track miles affected by terrorist incidents around the world are difficult to acquire, and 
the one successful terrorist incident on American rail, given the miles that Amtrak uses 
and the years of service, will on its face provide a very high probability of exceedance. 
Over time, as data becomes available, such an analysis might prove useful. Regardless of 
the availability of these data, however, it is clear that the failure probability of the system 
increases with the length of track and the number of stations. 
                                                 
259 “The Private Texas High-Speed Rail Line Won’t Stop in Downtown Houston,” CityLab, last 
modified November 19, accessed November 22, 2015, http://www.citylab.com/commute/2015/11/amid-
great-progress-texas-high-speed-rail-takes-a-big-step-back/416733/?utm_source=nl__link5_111915.  
260 AECOM, Dallas to Houston High-Speed Rail Project Alignment Alternatives Analysis Report 
(Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, 2015), 4. 
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V. OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a quantitative approach to analyzing the macro-level policy 
options. The State of Texas is faced with two possible approaches to this new HSR 
activity:  
1. Texas requires homeland security standards for the proposed high-speed 
train (action) and  
2. Texas does not require homeland security standards for the proposed high-
speed train (status quo).  
The possible outcomes are:  
1. There is no attack (including the possibilities that an attack was prevented, 
or thwarted before it reached the operational stage);  
2. An attack occurred but was unsuccessful (another way of saying this 
would be that an attack occurred that we were prepared for); and  
3. An attack occurred that was successful/an attack occurred for which we 
were not prepared.  
Looking at the issue from the perspective of the State of Texas, it would find 
more utility in not adding requirements because this approach would minimize any 
additional effort and cost. However, the probability of attacks, and those attacks being 
successful, increase if Texas does not act (this assumes that under the status quo, Texas 
already has requirements that are compatible with but supplemental to federal 
requirements, are in addition to any security plan initially implemented independently by 
the railroad company, and are effective). Under either option, the utility drops 
precipitously if an attack is successful. On the one hand, all things being equal, one might 
expect the utility of a successful attack to be more under the status quo option than under 
the action option because less money and effort have been expended to achieve the same 
outcome; however, there is a political factor involved. Should an attack be successful, a 
government that has not directed action toward the issue will be perceived more 
negatively than a government that has taken steps but not done enough.  
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This chapter provides a quantitative comparison of the status quo and active 
approach options using the utility tree analysis as outlined by Morgan D. Jones.261 
Conducting a quantitative comparison and analysis under this method involves two 
variables and a product. A variable is assigned to provide a measure of the utility of a 
given outcome for each approach. Another variable is assigned as an estimate of how 
likely that given outcome might be for each approach. The two variables are multiplied 
together to get the product—the expected value—which takes the utility of an outcome 
and tempers or conditions it based on the likelihood of its occurrence. After the 
assignment of utility values U, the estimate of likelihood of outcome xP, and the 
calculation of the expected value (EV=U*xP). The results are then ranked to reveal the 
most desirable choice. For this exercise, I have assigned a fairly high likelihood of 
attempted terrorist attack under the status quo option, 80 percent, based on a subjective 
evaluation of the quantitative and qualitative analysis of various conditions described 
elsewhere in this writing. Table 2 contains the quantitative calculations of a utility matrix 
for state regulation of high-speed rail security.  
Table 2.   Utility Matrix for State Regulation of High-Speed Rail Security 
Perspective: 




























































                                                 
261 Morgan D. Jones, The Thinker’s Toolkit: Fourteen Powerful Techniques for Problem Solving 
(New York: Three Rivers Press, 1998), 252.  
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B. ANALYSIS 
The expected values came out lower and closer than I had anticipated. I may have 
been a little harsh on the combined federal and corporate effort in the absence of state 
regulation, assigning an 80 percent chance that an attack is attempted without state 
action. However, even if I double that to a 40 percent probability of no attack under the 
status quo and reduce the probability of successful attack to .3, the ranking stays the 
same. The ranking would change if I reduced the probability of an unsuccessful attack 
when unregulated to .3, but that would then be the same probability as an unsuccessful 
attack when regulated, which I do not believe is supportable.  
If I were going to add other perspectives, I might consider the issue from the 
angle of the railroad company, the TSA, the property owners along the route, and the 
passengers. Generally, the railroad company would find more utility in less regulation. I 
do not have enough information to speculate as to the federal government’s preference or 
if they would have one. While Texans are known generally for preferring limited 
regulation, property owners along the route would probably perceive benefits to 
additional homeland security and prefer state action but would also want the additional 
requirements paid for by the corporation as opposed to tax dollars. Passengers, in my 
estimation, would be neutral to favorable toward more regulation as long as regulations 
were perceived to provide more security and were unobtrusive; however, regulations that 
impede the process or are perceived as heavy handed (e.g., TSA-style passenger 
screening) would have less utility. As my writing is intended to inform state 
policymakers, I weigh heavily the state’s perspective.  
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There is a history of terrorist actions against passenger trains and stations, 
including on HSRs. Even so, this writing is the first in its specific application to the TCR 
project. A review of the various major components and selected subcomponents shows 
vulnerabilities and the potential for current or future threats in these areas. A fault tree 
analysis suggests that a failure of any of four of the six major components could have 
catastrophic results. An analysis of options shows that under certain assumptions the state 
should act, either by directly requiring certain homeland security standards or by 
assigning state agencies with responsibilities regarding security for the TCR project 
proposed to connect Dallas and Houston, Texas.  
The proposed system is similar to an existing system in Japan, which has 
experienced fatalities and injuries during operation. In addition, several high-speed 
passenger systems around the world have experienced terrorist attacks, as has the 
Japanese rail system, although not its high-speed rail system directly. Security for the 
proposed system can be evaluated using a framework developed by the Argonne National 
Laboratory and combining what we know about the proposed system with what we have 
learned from experience with railroads, passenger transportation, electric and cyber 
systems, and terrorist incidents.  
The State of Texas should require homeland security standards for high-speed 
rail. These standards would provide a baseline set of requirements for projects of this 
nature and could include how law enforcement is achieved, how the project interacts with 
the intelligence community, considerations regarding cyber security, passenger privacy, 
vulnerability and threat assessment, and participation in planning committees. This topic 
will be of interest to an audience of policymakers, homeland security practitioners, and 
possibly even the project developers. It provides some flexibility so that if this project 
should cease, the research would lay the groundwork for a paradigm applicable to future 
projects.  
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Texas may wish to take a formal position regarding passenger and baggage 
screening, and it may also desire to set certain standards or requirements regarding 
cybersecurity as well as the collection and control of transaction data, including 
personally identifiable information. An overarching question for consideration is whether 
the legislature sets requirements, authorizes an agency like the DPS to set requirements, 
or allows the new project to go forward within the framework of existing laws. Given the 
unique and precedent setting nature of the project, the legislature should be proactive in 
creating specific requirements or expectations and in ensuring that state enforcement 
agencies have sufficient authority to ensure the provision of public safety for a private 
sector transportation project. These requirements may include a legal ability to acquire 
and enforce representations made regarding the system’s security provisions. 
The state may wish to mandate how this enterprise will share or participate in 
sharing intel with law enforcement agencies, and it may specifically assign responsibility 
to the DPS for enforcement and oversight, including ensuring that the chosen method of 
policing and sharing intel complies with law and is effective. Other responsibilities 
having to do with emergency response may also be assigned, possibly to other state units 
like the Department of State Health Services, which may address mental health plans, for 
example, as appropriate. Legislative leaders may wish to designate an oversight 
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